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Abstract
This dissertation contains three essays, which focus on markets featuring heavy
government intervention. The first two study the effects of Uber’s entry into the taxi
industry of New York City. The final essay, coauthored with Boyoung Seo, studies
intervention in the growing market for electric vehicles in California.
In the first chapter I quantify the magnitude and distribution of the welfare offered
by Uber’s cab-to-customer matching technology. I combine publicly available trans-
portation data with data scraped from Uber and traffic cameras in New York City
to estimate a model of demand for transportation services and imbed it in a spatial
equilibrium framework in which Uber and taxis compete. Uber’s matching advantage
depends on the density of the market. In consumer welfare terms, the introduction of
Uber added only $0.10 per ride in the densest parts of New York but over $1.00 in
the least dense. These results imply Uber’s appeal in its densest market has depended
on advantages independent from its matching technology, including its lower regulatory
burden.
In the second chapter I document the potential of digitization to reduce statistical
discrimination. First, I find that the search behavior of hail taxis, even controlling
for profitability, highlights statistical discrimination against certain consumers. Second,
Uber has mitigated the negative externalities in the cab markets among these consumers.
A reasonable hypothesis is that Uber’s matching technology permits contracts without
the cost of undirected searching in previously avoided areas of the city.
In the final chapter, my coauthor and I assess the efficacy of vehicle subsidy programs
and investment in a charging station network on demand for electric vehicles. In con-
trast to previous literature, we consider heterogeneity in tastes for electric vehicles and
price elasticities across demographics, as well as the heterogenous marginal benefits of
charging stations, and demonstrate the importance of both dimensions in correctly iden-
tifying the impact of subsidies and charging stations on demand. We use zip code-level
data on vehicle purchases in California to estimate a random coefficient discrete choice
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Chapter 1
Density of Demand and the
Benefit of Uber
1.1 Introduction
Since the company’s founding in 2009, Uber and the ride-sharing business at large
have transformed the once stagnant taxi cab market. Recent research by Cohen et al.
(2016) estimates that Uber delivered a consumer surplus of nearly $6.8 billion dollars
to the United States in 2015 alone. The magnitude and distribution of these consumer
benefits, however, depend in large part on whether Uber can facilitate transactions that
were otherwise cost prohibitive or impossible under existing services. In this paper I
propose that Uber’s technological advantage in matching consumers over these existing
taxis highly depends on a market’s density of potential demand. For New York City,
I find that this advantage shrinks significantly with density. The technology difference
translates to highly heterogenous consumer surplus gains from Uber; I estimate that
they vary by over a factor of ten from the least dense to most dense areas in the study.
One of Uber’s principal innovations in the transportation market is the way the
platform matches consumers to drivers. Compared to a system in which people must
physically hail a taxi, Uber’s technology has effectively allowed potential customers to
hail cabs blocks or miles from their location. While telephone-based dispatch services
offered an analogous service, Uber and similar companies refined the system by using
1
2geo-positioning to minimize the time a customer must wait for a driver. How advanta-
geous this system is over hailing, however, depends on a market’s geography. In very
dense markets, like central Manhattan, where vacant cabs drive through most streets
frequently, physically waving down a taxi can result in a match quickly. By comparison
the same customer may wait longer for the contracted Uber. The Uber driver must nav-
igate to her location and try to identify the correct person to pick up on a busy street.
This simple intuition drives the central hypothesis of the paper. Uber’s technology in
matching consumers is advantageous in less dense markets but evaporates and can even
be detrimental in highly dense areas.
This paper quantifies the technological matching advantage Uber has over taxis,
the extent to which it depends on a market’s density of potential demand, and the
implications for the consumer value of Uber in these different areas. The New York
City taxi market has an ideal setting to study this relationship. Besides being the
largest taxi market in the United States, the city features wide variation in density
from central Manhattan to less dense Manhattan and the outer boroughs.1 This
geography offers key variation across which to contrast the demand for taxis and Uber.
To study the development of the market I use publicly available trip-level data on
the pickups of taxis and for-hire vehicles like Uber. These rich records permit a study
of the New York over both space and time. I augment this dataset with two unique
sources on consumer wait times for Uber and taxis. In the first I scraped the Uber app
on a simulated Android phone to collect wait time and surge price data for that service
in 47 locations across the city at different times of day. For taxis I follow Frechette et
al. (2016) in using the pickup data to estimate a measure of the time consumers wait for
taxis. I calculate these wait times at a granular level with respect to location and time,
and discipline these estimates by using scraped traffic feeds to record the frequency of
taxi traffic at key intersections throughout the city. I treat these wait times as the
interface the consumer has to each of these platforms’ technologies. Simple patterns in
the trends of Uber and taxis over time in conjunction with these wait times delivers a
hint at the major result of the paper. In the less dense parts of NYC, the taxi market
has expanded with the growth of Uber. The wait times for an Uber in these areas are
1 Approximately 20% of US taxi cab drivers are based out of New York and the city hosted 10% of
Uber’s 2 billion global rides in 2016.
3much lower than for taxis. In Manhattan, however, Uber has cannibalized the share of
taxis in the market without much overall expansion. In these same areas, the wait time
for an Uber is often no better or even worse than for a taxi.
These stark findings motivate a model with a focus on controlling for geographic
heterogeneity to isolate the effects of density. I break up this modeling problem into two
parts. In the first, I develop a standard discrete choice demand model for transportation
in granular submarkets of New York City. The demand model incorporates not only taxi
and Uber but also alternative transportation choices, most importantly public transit
options. Another important feature of the demand side is that I permit unobserved
heterogeneity in the tastes for different choices across the city. This heterogeneity allows
the model to capture consumer preferences for Uber over alternatives that I cannot
directly model, such as better quality vehicles or the ability for consumers to screen
drivers. All of these features are critical to ensure that I can separate out the demand
for taxis as a function of geographic density from the quality of these outside options in
the particular submarket. Because consumers do not care about technology differences
across taxi and Uber per se but rather the prices and wait times they experience, both
of which I measure directly, I estimate this portion of the model separately from supply.
The results from this demand model deliver immediate results on the change of
consumer surplus from Uber across density. Following the methodology of the new
product literature (see Petrin (2002)), I compare my time of study in 2016 to market
data from 2013 as a baseline when Uber did not exist.2 I estimate a $0.10 per ride
compensating variation to Uber riders giving up their Uber in the densest parts of the
city but up to $1.00 per ride to Uber riders in the least dense markets. As a percent of
revenue per rides in the same area, values range from approximately 2% to 10%.
The second part of the model, the supply side, adds several features. The first is to
estimate the relative efficiency of taxis versus Uber in areas of different density. This
efficiency is a key set of parameters in the structural model. The second is to allow for
equilibrium counterfactuals that test whether the consumer surplus brought by Uber is
driven by technology or the strict regulatory regime capping the number of yellow taxis
at levels below that which Uber operates. The supply model I employ is an extension of
2 Uber technically did operate in the city already. Section 2 makes the argument that Uber’s
presence was small enough at that time to ignore its impact on the market.
4the spatial equilibrium model introduced by Buchholz (2017) building off the oblivious
equilibrium framework of Weintraub et al. (2008). The model itself, however, differs
in two critical ways. First, I allow alternative platforms — in this case Uber — to
exist in the same market as taxis. Second, I leverage the model and my collected data
on wait times to estimate taxi matching efficiency in each of the submarkets I study
rather than imposing it as the same for the entire city or large subregions of the city.
This alteration alone is essential to allow the efficiency of taxi matching to change with
submarket density. A key result from the estimation of this model is that matching
efficiency for taxi cabs is indeed highly correlated with market density.
The counterfactuals fed to the supply model focus on tracking welfare and service
quality changes from alterations to the taxi regulatory regime. In one key counterfactual
I replace every Uber with a yellow taxi to determine the net impact on service quality by
simply allowing yellow cabs to sidestep quota regulations. I find yellow taxis decidedly
cannot replace Uber to match the same service quality measured in wait times, partic-
ularly in the less dense areas of the city. The result highlights that Uber offers genuine
technological change in the less dense markets, where previous transactions with taxis
were infeasible. In the densest markets of the city, matching technology is insufficient
to explain why consumers have switched from taxi to Uber. Measuring service quality
as wait times alone yields a result that dense markets would be better off with taxis
replacing Uber.
Another principal counterfactual assesses a real policy in consideration in the debate
around NYC transportation services. In this counterfactual I introduce a congestion
tax on Uber for pickups in parts of Manhattan. Although I assume the incidence falls
entirely on Uber, consumers in Manhattan substitute back to taxis as Uber service
quality diminishes for a given volume of demand. Ultimately, the cost is born by the
outer areas of New York since the tax reduces how much Manhattan can subsidize Uber
drivers’ operations in the outer parts of the city, and they exit the market.3
To my knowledge this paper is the first to discuss the magnitude and geography-
based distribution of the welfare benefits offered by Uber’s matching technology. It
is not, however, the first to evaluate the consumer welfare impact of having a better
3 As recently as March 2018 NYC policy makers have considered congestion taxes of the form
proposed at the end of this paper. See https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/nyregion/congestion-
pricing-new-york.html.
5matching technology for taxi-like services in New York. The closely related work of
Frechette et al. (2016) and Buchholz (2017) both develop models of the taxi market
in NYC. Frechette et al. (2016) explores this question through an aggregate model
of the market to measure the cost of search frictions. In counterfactual simulations
of the market, they introduce an Uber-like matching system by having a dispatcher
link potential consumers to the closest cab within a mile. This paper builds off their
findings in several dimensions. This work has the benefit of data on both Uber and
taxis. The data allow me to explicitly model heterogeneity in the demand for these two
services along more than just the wait time. On the supply side the data are crucial
for estimating the relative efficiency of these two platforms across densities. Ultimately,
a key finding from this paper mirrors a major result from their counterfactuals. They
show that a dispatching system is a larger improvement over the existing technology
when demand is thinner across the course of the day. This paper makes the same claim
but across locations in the city.
The model in Buchholz (2017), in contrast, allows rich spatial heterogeneity in the
market for taxis. In a counterfactual the research simulates the introduction of a more
efficient matching technology by assuming that cabs can perfectly reach customers in
each of several locations across the city. This paper shows, however, that the value of
these services depends on several qualities of these different submarkets. One crucial
advantage that Uber has over taxis, for example, is to match with consumers far from
their current location. The incremental value of this difference over regular taxis depends
on the density of the location, per the results in this paper. The real Uber matching
system can also be disadvantageous in some locations, an aspect missed by modeling
Uber as a hail cab with better efficiency. The value of Uber’s matching technology also
depends on the substitutability of taxis with alternative forms of transportation. How
elastic customer response is to better matching depends on these outside options, which
I explicitly control by estimating demand for a full model of a city’s transportation
services.
Recent research has also leveraged Uber data to directly measure the value of the
company and its impact on the taxi industry. Cohen et al. (2016) estimates an aggregate
measure of the consumer surplus generated by Uber. They suggest Uber has generated
a potential $6.8 billion consumer surplus in the United States for 2015 alone. The
6result cannot account for significant intra-city and inter-city variance in this surplus.
Additionally, total surplus changes depend on Uber’s impact on existing services over
time. Depending on whether Uber expands the market for taxi services or simply
displaces it, welfare gains estimated from short-term analysis may be mitigated by
accounting for the quality of alternatives. Other research quantifies the benefits of
Uber to the labor side of the market. Hall and Krueger (2015) and Chen et al. (2017)
identify and quantity the labor-side welfare impact from Uber’s flexible supply model,
in contrast to traditional cab systems that work on fixed shift times.
This research additionally complements a recent explosion of research around both
Uber and the taxicab industry, a few of which directly contrast Uber with traditional
taxis. Cramer and Krueger (2016) look at the dimension of utilization rate, how often a
cab is occupied, as a measure of Uber’s relative efficiency. While not directly modeling
these effects, they attribute utilization differences to the matching technology, Uber’s
scale, regulations, and the flexible supply model. Notably, they find Uber’s utilization
rate is significantly higher in all cities, save NYC. This paper models the first three of
those forces though using expansion rather than utilization as a performative measure.
Berger et al. (2017) examine the interaction of Uber and incumbents through the lens of
employment and earnings. Their results contrast with a story of Uber rapidly destroying
incumbents in the market, a result echoed in the NYC taxi market particularly. Bian
(2017) focuses on the existence of network effects in the matching processes for these
platforms. To some extent I capture this effect by allowing matching efficiency to vary
with the scale of transactions; consumers may indirectly respond to the size of the
“network” through the waiting time.
Naturally, Uber’s signature surge pricing has itself been the subject of intense study.
While I currently treat surge pricing as exogenously set by Uber in my estimation,
other papers endogenize their problem. Castillo et al. (2017) find surge pricing solves
a problem inherent in dispatch models of taxi operation — in contrast to street hail
models. Flexible prices can deter demand from growing beyond supply capacity, thus
preventing hypercongestion. Bimpikis et al. (2016) focus on the more familiar allocative
role of surge pricing. They highlight the increasingly important role surge pricing plays
in the profitability of unbalanced markets, in which some areas of the market feature
much higher levels of demand than others at a given price. Both pieces of research
7suggest that the “non-matching” innovations Uber brought to the market, dynamic
pricing and the flexible supply side, could be critical to its sustainability.4
For transportation policy makers this literature and the new results developed in
this paper might inform the vigor with which they try to regulate Uber and similar
ride-sharing services. If the difference from existing taxis — granted few cities feature
incumbents of the style in NYC — is largely in regulation avoidance, incumbents have
little to fear from regulating ride-sharing services on equal footing. As of the time
of writing, New York City has already begun moving in this direction. The city has
lowered the barriers between incumbents and Uber on the supply side by introducing
a universal taxi license. They have also attempted to crack the shift change rules with
a pilot program allowing flexible driving hours. In contrast London has taken steps to
ban Uber entirely.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview of the recent history
of taxi services in NYC and a larger view of Uber’s expansion and regulatory fights
across the country. In this section I also describe my methodology for collecting price
and wait time data for taxis and Uber; I then use it to develop descriptive evidence of the
impact of Uber on the existing taxi market. Sections 3 and 4 present the demand and
supply models to take it to the data. Section 5 presents the results from this estimation
along with counterfactual analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes with thoughts on future
research.
1.2 Evolution of Uber and Taxis in the New York City
Market
While the last five years have brought volatility to the New York City transportation
market, two key platforms have emerged (or remained): traditional street-hail taxis,
which I will refer to as taxis, and Uber. This section will briefly describe the broader
changes in the market over these past several years. The focus then moves to taxis and
Uber, describing their operation and the regulatory regime they face. Here, I explain
my method of constructing prices and wait times to explore quality differences between
4 Enormous subsidies from cheap financial capital are likely critical as well. I am not familiar with
any research isolating this dimension.
8the two platforms.
The section provides evidence of two key facts. The market for cab services has
expanded but the magnitude of that expansion is highly correlated with an area’s ge-
ographic density. Additionally, Uber has largely displaced traditional taxis in dense
markets while contributing to an expanding market elsewhere. These two facts lay
the groundwork for identifying the magnitude of Uber’s technological advantage over
traditional taxis in the structural model.
1.2.1 Brief Description of the Market
Prior to Uber’s launch into the NYC market in May 2011, taxicab services were split
primarily between street-hail yellow taxis and pre-arranged dispatched cabs, known as
for-hire vehicles (FHVs). The Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) governed these
two segments markedly differently. FHVs are restricted from picking up street hails
(legally) but operated under comparatively free circumstances. Hard caps did and do
not exist for FHVs nor are companies operating FHVs subject to strict price controls.
In practice NYC has long had many more FHVs than hail cabs, but they were still far
less ubiquitous on the road. While hail cabs completed hundreds of thousands of trips
per day, FHVs completed on average about 20 or 30 thousand.
In contrast hail taxis are highly regulated. Two regulations through the period of
interest are of particular importance. The first is the infamous medallion system limiting
the number of yellow taxis on the road. From 2011 to the present day, the number of
available medallions has fluctuated from 13,237 to 13,587. Because these medallions
are required for the operation of yellow cabs and, until recently, in high demand, they
became famous for their prices peaking in 2014 at over $1 million. For independent
medallion owners, mandated to be around 40% of the market, the entrance costs are
obvious; for cab drivers leasing cabs from corporate owners, the costs are passed down
in the required weekly leasing payment, itself regulated by the TLC to prevent gouging
drivers. The second important regulation are the strict price controls on ride fares.
The cap on the number of medallions and the stagnant FHV market left many parts
of the city poorly serviced. Then Mayor Bloomberg perceived the problem as significant
enough in early 2011, perhaps notably before the arrival of Uber, to warrant an initiative
9to improve taxi service in the outer boroughs.5 The solution, Boro (or “green”) cabs,
first hit the roads in August 2013. Many were simply converted livery cabs previously
falling under the umbrella of FHV regulation.
For the purpose of this paper, green cabs also face two important regulations. These
cabs can operate exactly like street hail yellow taxis, including the price regime, except
at John F. Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports and in Manhattan below East 96th and
West 110th Streets.6 Figure 1.1 illustrates this exclusion zone over a map of the city.
The second is that green cab vehicle licenses are capped, like yellow taxis, but they are
available for a fixed fee. In the first year the TLC made 6,000 available for a price of
$1,500. Every year thereafter licenses were available at a price of $3,000.7 These
regulations introduce a type of taxi with identical technology but a lower cost to enter
the market, and, importantly, the geographic restrictions introduced a new supply of
taxis in areas once scarcely visited by yellow taxis.
Uber, of course, significantly differs from both yellow and green taxis in terms of
matching technology and regulation.8 Uber drivers are prohibited from picking up
street hails, though the dispatching model of ride-sharing companies circumvents that
process by using the a phone app to make the match. While Uber drivers in New
York City do not face the same legal operating costs as taxi drivers, they are still more
regulated than drivers from other cities.9 First, Uber is regulated just as any FHV is,
and drivers must obtain a special license through the same process. Uber itself must also
operate through base stations and satisfy the same administrative costs and burdens
as other FHV companies. These similarities allay concerns that driver quality might
5 This initiative actually came a year after the arrival of Uber. The State of the City address in
January 2011 was the first acknowledgement of outer borough service as a priority: “Why shouldn’t
someone in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, or Staten Island be able to hail a legal cab on the street? 97
percent of yellow cab pick-ups happen in Manhattan or at the airports — even though 80 percent of
New Yorkers live outside of Manhattan.”
6 These cabs, unlike yellow taxis, can also continue to serve pre-dispatched rides from their base.
My data only include the hail rides they complete.
7 Although there is an overall cap of 18,000 green cabs, only about 8,000 have been purchased to
the present day; hence, the supply cap has not been binding.
8 App-based matching services for taxis first arrived for taxis in September 2015. CMT and Verifone,
the two credit card operators covering approximately 8,000 covering approximately 14,000 yellow and
green taxis, respectively, licensed different companies for their apps. Unfortunately, it is unclear what
the uptake on these services has been. They were unsuccessful enough to require relaunching the
programs in April 2016 toward the end of the period of interest.
9 See Kleiner (2017).
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be an unobserved, but important, difference between Uber and taxis.10 Table 1.1
summarizes the key differences across yellow and green taxis and Uber.
The regulatory systems for these three platforms coalesce to create uneven relative
costs for the different taxi technologies across New York City. In the green taxi exclusion
zone of Manhattan, the hail technology requires a hefty fee, in the form of the medallion,
to pick up potential consumers. The Uber model, along with other ride-sharing services,
completely avoid this cost. Past the exclusion zone, the different technologies are on a
more level playing field.
1.2.2 Mapping the Growth of Uber Over Time
Uber’s ubiquity may be enough to convince one of the magnitude of Uber’s operation
in NYC. Figure 1.2 illustrates its expansion in terms of total monthly pickups over
time. These data come from the TLC, which publishes detailed trip-level data for
green and yellow taxis and, since 2015, pickup location by taxi zone and time data
for FHVs, including Uber. The figure delineates two important cutoffs. The first is
the introduction of green cabs in July 2013; it sees a steady rise in its pickups for
about six months before largely flatlining, despite the availability of more permits after
August 2014. The second is January 2015 when FHV data, including for Uber, is first
consistently available. Lyft, which I can also separate from the rest of the FHV data, is
part of the “Other FHV” category and a relatively small operation compared to Uber
in this time period. The big takeaway, however, is Uber’s performance compared to the
yellow taxis over this time period. From when I first have data on Uber pickups in April
2014 — these early data are not available consistently through to 2015 — to July 2016,
yellow taxis shrank from twenty-six times the operation of Uber to two times the size.
The story is incomplete, however, without looking at Uber’s expansion across the
city and the relationship of its growth with market density. Ideally, I would measure
density as the number of potential consumers per unit of area and time. Ignoring the
dimension of time, this ideal measure is particularly farfetched to obtain in New York
because of the notorious difficulty in measuring the movement of population over the
course of the day. These challenges motivate restrictions I introduce later in the paper
10 Hall et al. (2017a) explicitly tests for quality differences in Uber drivers potentially arising by
NYC regulations and find little evidence of a difference.
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to limit the demand analysis to morning commuters. For now I use a different proxy for
the potential density of demand, capturing relative geographic density across the city.
In particular I use zoning data from New York’s Property Land Use Tax Lot Output
(PLUTO) to calculate the ratio of building space to the surface area of each taxi zone.
Figure 1.7 depicts this measure overlaying the city.11 As a cursory check for the
usefulness of this measure, I note that it is positively correlated with the total taxi
pickups normalized by the size of each taxi zone in Figure 1.8. In the model sections of
this paper I will distinguish between this geographic density and transaction density, the
latter referring to the volume of matches in a given area and time and can be considered
analogous to market scale.
As seen in Figure 1.7 the exclusion zone marker, denoted by the thick black line,
provides a natural break for a cursory analysis to compare the development of the taxi
market in areas of different geographic density. The green exclusion zone, i.e. most
of Manhattan, is, geographically, the densest part of the city while density drops off
quickly in the other boroughs. Figures 1.3a and 1.3b map monthly pickup data by taxi
or FHV type for pickups originating inside and outside the green cab exclusion zone,
respectively. Outside of the exclusion zone, Uber is the largest platform in the market by
July 2016 and the growth has, largely, not been at the expense of yellow and green taxis.
Inside the exclusion zone, Uber remains the smaller competitor but has gained at the
expense of the yellow taxis. Year-on-year monthly pickup growth inside the exclusion
zone from 2015 to 2016 is, on average, slightly higher than 5% and outside the zone
upward of 40%. Even in absolute terms growth is higher outside the exclusion zone by
a factor of 2. By the end of the second quarter of 2016, Uber served approximately the
same number of rides in and out of the exclusion zone but commanded a larger market
share in most taxi zones outside (see Figure 1.9).
In Appendix A.2.1 I conduct a more granular analysis of the relationship between
patterns in the market and density with observations at the level of taxi zone. The
two key facts from the wider analysis hold even at finer levels. First, the market for
taxi-like services has expanded relatively more in less dense zones of the city. Second,
Uber and taxis are nearly perfect substitutes, in terms of 1:1 replacement of rides from
11 I also carried out the analysis from this section using the ratio of building space to the length of
road bordering and running through the area. The change results in no qualitative differences.
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yellow taxis to Uber, over time in the most dense zones.
These trends paint a stark picture that motivates the theory in this paper. In
the city’s geographically densest markets, those in the exclusion zone, overall growth is
minimal and hence Uber’s gains come at the expense of yellow taxis. Enough consumers
prefer Uber to taxi to switch, but the offering is not sufficiently valuable relative to
alternatives to draw from other sources of transportation. Outside this area yellow and,
importantly, green service plateaus early despite the latter operating below its supply
cap. The ascendency of Uber and ride-sharing services in these sparse areas do not
cannibalize existing business but is part of pure expansion. A natural hypothesis to
draw is that potential green cab drivers found it insufficiently profitable to service areas
that Uber can or was insufficiently attractive to generate the demand.12
1.2.3 Constructing Wait and Price Data for Uber and Taxis
The two key pieces of ride quality data by which consumers in this paper compare
Uber and taxis are their prices and wait times. Unfortunately, only price data for taxis
are readily available. Trip-level data from the TLC break down various components of
each ride, like trip distance and time and, most relevantly, total trip fare. Additionally,
because the taxi fare structure is fixed, I can approximate the cost of counterfactual
rides with decent accuracy. The following sections detail how I collect the remaining
price and wait data.
Uber Wait Times and Price
The trip records provided by the TLC for FHVs, which include Uber, do not provide
the same information on prices. While Uber has a fixed fare structure for each of its
products, its well-known surge pricing mechanism multiplies these prices in locations
with especially heavy demand, relative to the available supply. Since these fees are
quite substantial relative to baseline prices, controlling for them as best as possible is
necessary for demand estimation.
To collect price information for Uber, I emulated an Android phone and automated
12 One caveat about reading expansion from the available data is that new entrants may have
cannibalized business from community vans, like “dollar vans.” These services are more comparable to
public transit than taxis.
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the process of feeding the Uber app locations throughout New York City over the period
of March to June 2016. I could then scrape the relevant data from the app itself. Every
hour and a half, I scraped the expected wait time — then labeled “ETA” in the app —
and surge price, which at the time showed up as a “[#]x” warning before agreeing to the
contract. Appendix A.1.1 has more details on this process. To interpolate wait times
at locations and times of day not sampled I used a simple inverse distance weighting
method over time and space sampling only points not separated by bodies of water.13
I use the same method of interpolation for surge prices with a more significant drop off
to account for the sharper change in surge prices by area and over time.14
Besides interpolation another potential source of measurement error is the accuracy
of the data reported to the consumer, i.e. the information I collect via scraping. Cohen
et al. (2016) reveal that actual surge prices charged are slightly different than the prices
shown to consumers. They report, however, these differences are marginal. Further,
since consumers have no way to learn “true” price, this issue should not affect their
transportation decision. On the other hand if wait times are consistently over or under-
estimated, this error will be unaccounted for when I use these data in the demand
estimation.
Taxi Wait Times
The final piece of critical information is the wait time for taxis. Frechette et al. (2016)
is the first paper of which I am aware that attempts to convert the raw TLC data into
information on how long consumers must wait for taxis. Two issues prevent me from
adopting their methodology wholesale. First, this paper’s research question revolves
around spatial heterogeneity in the competition of taxis and Uber; hence, I need a metric
for wait times at a fairly granular level. Second, the data available from the TLC has
changed in the intervening years. Fitting their simulated model requires knowledge of
the search time for each cab. For the data available in that time period, it was possible
to track cabs over the course of the day. Since 2013 the TLC removed these identifiers
13 Future versions of this paper will employ a more sophisticated distance metric using actual travel
distance for the spatial dimension.
14 Uber uses zones, unknown to me, to set surge prices so it less reasonable to assume a smooth
transition of prices over locations. On the temporal dimension surge prices are highly volatile (see
Diakopoulos (2015)).
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because of privacy concerns. Without the ability to track a cab, the data do not indicate
how much time each taxi spent searching for a new passenger.
In my adjusted procedure I generate a probabilistic count of taxis on each of New
York’s street segments throughout the day.15 I use this count to estimate how long it
takes for a vacant cab to pass through each segment without a pickup. Ideally, I would
know precisely when customers arrive on a street segment to determine the time for a
cab to pass them. This procedure does not assume a structure on customer arrival and
measures wait time as how long a marginal consumer on each segment would have to
wait for a cab to arrive. Hence, in reality some consumers in the data might be more
or less “lucky” in catching a cab than what I measure. Since I cannot follow individual
cabs, instead I keep track of how far the taxi could have traveled in an allotted time.
Within this travel area is every possible route the cab could have taken based on a street
map of NYC. For tracking purposes subsequent pickups are randomly assigned to any
cab that could have made it to the location in time. This assignment generates a guess
of the path of cabs between drop off and pickup. The full details of this algorithm and
the additions that follow are described in Appendix A.1.2.
To improve the guess of which paths vacant taxis took, I scraped traffic camera data
available publicly via the New York City Department of Transportation.16 Figure 1.10
marks each camera location by a blue dot. I captured a roughly continuous feed — each
camera updates a still image approximately every 4 or 5 seconds — for every camera 6
times a day with an additional measurement on Fridays and Saturdays for the months
of September and December 2015.17 On average I captured 600 images from each
half hour block per camera. To follow a single camera for the entire two month period
requires processing approximately 200,000 images. I spent the equivalent of 2 months
working time selectively processing the images of roughly 150 cameras across the city.18
Figure 1.11 shows a screen capture of the program I put together to process the
15 The area I track is limited to the areas covered in the estimation portion of the paper (see
Figure 1.12).
16 Source: http://nyctmc.org
17 The specific times I started the camera captures were 3 AM, 9 AM, 12 AM, 2 PM, 5 PM, and
10 PM. I also captured 8 PM on Friday and Saturday. I also collected data in June 2016, closer to the
period of estimation, but these images have not been processed.
18 For the curious, or sympathetic, reader I first attempted to process the images using machine
learning-based computer vision programs. Unfortunately, that these cameras produce static images
rather than a video feed confounded my best attempts at that solution. Additionally, it proved difficult
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images from the cameras. The key questions are those asking about “new and empty”
taxis, that is, those marked vacant by a light atop the taxi in the image.
1.2.4 Contrasting Taxi and Uber
With taxi and Uber prices and wait times calculated, I close the section by contrasting
these two services in select parts of the city. Figure 1.4 highlights a few popular origins
and destinations to contrast the price and wait time for taxis and Uber over the course
of the day using 2016 prices. The taxi price in the image is the median for all observed
trips in March 2016. Uber prices are calculated using the fare structure at the time,
the average weekday surge price for the time of day, and the median trip distance and
time. Reported wait times are the average weekday wait for the time of day; note that
they do not depend on the destination.
A few facts are obvious. Uber is typically cheaper, but it depends on the surge
price at the time. They do not, however, always bear the advantage in wait time. In
Williamsburg, a less geographically dense location outside of Manhattan, the wait time
for an Uber is on average lower across the day, even though both green and yellow
taxis can pick up there. In Manhattan, particularly the locations I have chosen, Uber’s
advantage depends on the time of day. The wait for taxis is higher during the shift
changes around 5AM/PM but otherwise lower on average. While these wait times
are functions of the market outcome and not the matching process alone, they may
hint at the conditions driving the patterns from Figures 1.3a and 1.3b. From the
wait perspective alone, Uber is hardly better and often worse than taxis in the most
dense markets of the city. These are also the areas of the city where the competition
between Uber and taxi has exhibited business stealing. Other factors may drive taxi
customers to Uber, but they are not sufficient to grow the market. Meanwhile, in the
outer boroughs, or at least in the Williamsburg neighborhood of Brooklyn, Uber offers
substantial improvement in this quality dimension. The outer boroughs are also where
there has been a significant expansion of the market.
to consistently determine whether a cab’s vacancy light is on in areas of vastly different lighting. In
future work the program I plan to outsource the processing of the cameras I missed and check the work
I did to further refine my wait time measurements.
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I conclude by noting a significant competitive advantage Uber, and other non reg-
ulated companies, have against taxi companies: the ability to change fare structures.
Uber has had two major rate cuts in the past several years. The first in July 2014
made the prices of the cheap UberX option roughly comparable to traditional taxis.
The second in February 2016 solidified Uber’s price advantage. Figure 1.5 compares the
actual price of all yellow taxi trips in March 2015 at the indicated locations against a
fitted Uber trip cost.19 At this point slightly more than half of Uber trips would have
been cheaper than taxis. The difference between a more or less expensive ride largely
depends on the time and distance of each trip since Uber charges by the minute and mile
differently than taxis. Figure 1.6 illustrates the same distribution but in March 2016.
After the price drop in February 2016 few Uber rides would have been more expensive
than the same taxi trip. The “surge price tail” drives most of the cases where taxis are
cheaper.
While I will not be modeling Uber’s decision to change its fare structure, the dif-
ference in and out of the exclusion zone to this February 2016 highlight each market’s
capacity to grow. In Manhattan the effect of the price change is a bump in rides that
follows an increase in rides for all taxis in February 2016. Meanwhile the period was
followed by stagnant growth relative to the previous year, which did not feature a price
change. One might worry that the price drop has a hollow effect because of the negative
impact it has on supply. The expansion pattern outside of the exclusion zone, however,
nullifies this argument. February 2016 marked an inflection point in the growth rate of
Uber in these areas of the city. This differential response emphasizes the need to model
the demand for these services with attention to heterogeneity across the city.
1.3 Structural Model
In this section I develop a structural spatial model of the NYC transportation market.
The model features two sets of decision makers. On the demand side consumers arrive
in separate zones across the city at specific times and make a discrete decision in their
choice of transportation to a pre-determined destination. These choices are not limited
19 The figure uses the surge price profile from 2016, but in practice affects a small percentage of
rides.
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to taxis and Uber, but also include the city’s public transportation network. On the
supply side I do not model the decision-making process of the principal governing taxi
and Uber drivers — the medallion owners or the division of Uber governing decisions for
NYC — rather I focus on the search decisions of the drivers themselves. This portion of
the model is an extension of Buchholz (2017), allowing multiple, here two, taxi platforms
to interact with each other as their respective drivers search for customers throughout
the city. The immediate purpose of explicitly modeling the supply side of the market
is to generate the distribution of cabs over the course of the day, figures which are not
observable from the available data, and estimate the efficiency with which taxis match
to consumers in areas of different geographic and transaction density.
1.3.1 Demand
Define a sub-market of New York as a zone l and time period t. The entire market for
New York City is the collection of zones L and time periods throughout the day T . In a
given sub-market I define the maximum potential demand Q˜tl , that is the total number
of consumers who are looking for a ride in l at t. At time t a fraction of those consumers
in l, γt(l, l′), seek to travel to location l′. Note also that
∑
l′ γ
t(l, l′) = 1.
A consumer i in zone l traveling to l′ faces a choice set C of transportation options
to complete the journey. These options may include public transit, taxis, Uber, walk-
ing, or an outside option, depending on availability. Both green and yellow taxis are
considered part of the same choice.20 Although standard for the literature, I justify
the assumption that consumers typically only use one transportation option per trip
in Appendix A.2.2. Besides the characteristics of the options, the choice might also
depend on consumer i’s income bracket g. The utility this particular consumer derives


















≡ V tij + εtij
Going forward I will suppress these time superscripts. pj is the cost in dollars of taking
20 This simplification requires the consumer who wants a taxi would take either a yellow or green
taxi, whichever responded to the hail first. It is possible consumers with a penchant for one color wait
longer for the ride of their desired choice, but that seems out of character for New Yorkers.
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the transit choice from li to l
′
i. αg(i), the marginal utility of money and hence value of
time, depends on the commuter’s income bracket, g. wj is the associated waiting time,
that is time not in transit, the commuter must expend with this transit choice. Xj is
a vector of other trip characteristics, including the travel time and associated walking
distance. The way consumers in this model can respond to congestion both explicit in
counterfactuals and in reality is through the travel time term, as congestion will impact
the travel time for Uber and taxis. ξj is transit choice-location-time unobserved demand.
This term may reflect latent time-area preferences for the transit choice or unobserved
qualities of the transit choice common regardless of location. For example, if consumers
have a taste for a greater relative taste for Uber in the morning to avoid waiting in the
cold, this preference would be picked up by ξj . Finally, εij is an additional idiosyncratic
taste shock. Consumer i then chooses option j if and only if
uij ≥ uik,∀k ∈ C
In total this utility model features parameters of interest θd = (α
′, βw, β′).
Following the standard process from the discrete choice literature, this decision can
be summarized as a choice probability. Let Aij be the set of εi = (ε0i, . . . , εJi) ratio-
nalizing choice j, that is Aij = {εi|uij ≥ uik, ∀k ∈ C}. The probability commuter i





Apart from the destination, the only distinguishing feature of each consumer is her
income. Let fl(di) be the distribution of income classifications in location l. I assume
this distribution is fixed for the location regardless of time of day and the destination.
Then the share and total quantity of consumers traveling from l to location k who





Qlk(j; θd) = Q˜lγ(l, k)qlk(j; θd) (1.4)
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γ(l, k)qlk(j; θd) (1.5)
Ql(j; θd) = Q˜lql(j; θd) (1.6)
Assumptions in the estimation section will permit an explicit formulation for Equa-
tion 1.2 and its dependents.
Demand in the Supply Model
In the supply model, taxi and Uber drivers take most features of each location in the city
as exogenous. For example, subway and bus schedules and their impact on a consumer’s
choice decision is an exogenous feature of each time and location. To drivers the relevant
demand information is Qtlk(j; θd) for j ∈ {Uber, Taxi}, where l and k are the origin and
destination, respectively. To emphasize that price and wait time are relative qualities
of Uber and taxi that can change over the course time21 , one can rewrite this function
as qj(p, w|l, k, t), where p and w are vectors of the price and wait time for the two taxi
platforms, for each j ∈ {Uber, Taxi}. qj(p, w|l, t) is the same function integrated over
destinations.
The supply model proceeds by describing the searching and matching procedure for
taxis and Uber. The setup largely follows Buchholz (2017) with a few critical differences.
First, I explicitly contrast the matching technology of an Uber and taxi. Additionally
their matching efficiency depends on the area of the city they serve. Finally, the model
predicts consumer wait times in the submarkets across the city thus allowing consumer
demand to respond to changes in service quality in counterfactuals.
1.3.2 Supply
There is a fixed supply of yellow taxis, green taxis, and Uber cars operating throughout
the city. These totals are denoted Vx, Vg, and Vu, respectively. Taxi and Uber drivers
operate among the locations L of New York. I assume drivers, regardless of platform,
21 Whereas Uber and taxis have no impact on the quality of other transit options in the area, for
example.
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attempt to maximize individual profits by picking up passengers over the course of a
shift. Both Uber’s system of loosely ride-based commission and taxi’s system of weekly
lease payments from drivers to owners are consistent with this goal. Throughout the
day, composed of distinct five-minute time periods t = {1, . . . , T}, vacant cabs search
for consumers and occupied cabs travel to the destination location designated by their
passenger. Any two locations l, k ∈ L in the city are linked by a distance δlk and a time
to travel τlk, the latter of which can change with the volume of traffic in the adjoining
areas. τll will denote an additional time to travel within a location for Uber only.
Arrival of Passengers
Having discussed demand in the previous section, I begin by fitting it into the supply
model. To accommodate that the total number of consumers looking for rides in a
particular submarket is likely not deterministic, I let Q˜tl be the parameter of a Poisson
distribution. In combination with the shares derived from the demand model, on average
the demand function for taxis and Uber will be
Qj(p, w|l, t) = Q˜tlγt(l, k)qj(p, w|l, k, t) (1.7)
for j ∈ {Taxi, Uber} where γt(l, k) is the location transition matrix introduced in the
demand section. Holding fixed (p, w), the Poisson setup allows random variation in the
scale of demand but not the relative demand between Uber and taxis. I assume that
drivers for all platforms are aware of the distributions of Q˜tl across the city over time
and the demand parameters θd, i.e. they have enough information to form expectations
over Qj(p, w|l, t). For now I again rewrite these functions for simplicity; denote Qtl,u the
demand for Ubers and Qtl,b the demand for taxis in location l at time t.
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Searching
I start with the discussion of the matching process for taxis, both green and yellow.
The critical difference in their operation compared to Uber is the process by which they
match to consumers.
22 Recall I assume consumers are indifferent between hailing a yellow or green taxi.
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Consider a period t and location l ∈ L. Each location l is also associated with a
dummy xl, which takes a value of 1 when green taxis are not allowed to pick up in that
area. The number of vacant taxis in location l at the beginning of the period is given
by vtl,b = (1−xl)vtl,g+vtl,x, where vtl,g and vtl,x are the number of vacant green and yellow
taxis, respectively.
















which can be further specified as a function of the area and the scale, or transaction
density, of the market. Section 1.4 will introduce assumptions on the form to make it
tractable in estimation. Critically this function imposes no forced relationship between
geographic density and efficiency.
Suppressing time the expected probability of finding a passenger from the perspective




Passengers in l seeking to travel to k, however, are not indifferent between traditional
taxis and Uber. Therefore, I also specify the joint probability of finding a match and
that match traveling to location k. Let qb(l, k) ≡ qb(p, w|l, k, t), suppressing the t, that





Hence plk,b is the probability that a cab is matched to a passenger and that passenger
requests to be taken to location k. Clearly
∑
k plk,b = pl,b, the probability of matching
at all.
From the perspective of a consumer, we can derive a similar expected probability of
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Note that the expectation is still over the total consumers who have arrived, and it
is assumed the number of vehicles which will pass through the location at the time is
known. This probability yields an expected wait time for the consumer to match a
taxi. If pl,c were constant over time it would be given by the mean of the geometric
distribution, i.e.
wl,b = 1/pl,c
measured in terms of the number of periods. Because pl,c adjusts with time, however, I
can approximate the wait time using a survival function. Let Stl (x) be the probability
of matching in the xth period after initial arrival in period t:





(1− pk+tl,c ) (1.12)
assuming that x + t ≤ T else it is 0. The expected wait time (in terms of number of




k ∗ Stl (k) (1.13)
where necessarily t+ T¯ ≤ T . Note consumers waiting for taxis are assumed to disappear
if they are not matched in their own period (and potentially born anew in the next
period), but it is still possible to calculate the time it would have taken to catch a cab.
The first key difference between an Uber and taxi is an Uber driver need not be in
the same location as a potential passenger to match to her. Indeed, their dispatching
technology is the central focus of their potential advantage over taxis. I assume that
Uber permits guaranteed matching at the expense of variation in the time needed for
Uber to get to its passenger. With taxis there is uncertainty whether a match will be
made but once the taxi is contracted the customer is in the cab. Although Uber assigns
customers to the nearest vacant driver, at least at the time the paper covers, the model
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will not specify the location of Uber vehicles with enough precision to replicate reality.
Therefore, I impose a rule to approximate this process.
At a given time vu = {vl,u}l describes the distribution of vacant Uber cabs across
any of the locations in the city. Likewise, Qu = {Ql,u}u is demand across the city.23
The share of consumers in l matched to an Uber in location k is given by the logit form
pkl,c =
exp(vk/(1 + τlk)1(τlk ≤ τ¯))
1 +
∑
k′ exp(vk′/(1 + τlk′)1(τlk′ ≤ τ¯))
(1.14)
where locations with a larger mass of vacant cabs and closer are likeliest to be the source
of the match. τ¯ is the farthest distance an Uber would be dispatched for a pickup.





Again, let qu(l, k) ≡ qu(p, w|l, k, t), the share of consumers who prefer Uber conditional









is the probability an Uber in location k′ is matched to consumer in l requesting to be
taken to location k. Note I do not allow Uber drivers to reject rides.24





23 Since mid 2016 Uber has begun assigning passengers to non-vacant cabs. Presumably, it would
be a straightforward extension to consider here, where all Uber cabs, occupied or otherwise would be
considered for the match, with the wait time also accounting for the time to drop off the last customer.
That is a needless complication for the period of consideration, though.
24 Ge et al. (2016) show that drivers do indeed discriminate against passengers. This would be
relevant to consumers in my model if consumers in certain areas have to wait longer in ways not
captured by the estimate given by the Uber app. The data I collected on wait times prior to finalizing
the transaction, however, do not allow me to determine if approximated (pre-finalization) and actual
wait times differentially diverge depending on one’s location.
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The result of this assignment process is how long a passenger must wait for the con-
tracted Uber and how long the Uber must drive (at its expense) to pick up that pas-
senger. I assume when a consumer opens the Uber app to observe the wait time, the








A final implication of the search behavior of taxis and Uber drivers is their impact on
congestion throughout the city. I model this impact by allowing transit speeds across
zones to differ with the level of taxis and Ubers searching in each of the zones. Consider
two proximal taxi zones l and k,












where e designates the count of employed cabs and g a function that can depend on
the zone pair. τ tlk for locations that are not proximal remain the shortest route between
l and k, considering the changes from traffic. In Section 1.4 I introduce assumptions
on the function to estimate it independent of the rest of the model. In counterfactual
simulations consumers will then respond to congestion through their preferences on
travel time.
Static Profits
I assume drivers on all platforms are only paid for rides.25 The fare structure, however,
depends on the type of platform. For taxis the fare structure is set by regulations with a
fixed price of φb and distance-based fare pib. Hence profits for a ride taking a passenger
from l to k are
Πxlk = φb + pibδlk − clk
25 In reality Uber has flexibility around this assumption I cannot capture. In the short-run Uber
might offer driver incentives detached from the fare structure.
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where cij are the costs, i.e. fuel, of travel on the trip. For green cabs I make the
adjustment
Πglk = (1− xl) [φb + pibδlk − clk]
that is, I force profits for green cabs to be 0 in areas where they should not pick up.
Uber’s fare structure is slightly different. In addition to a commission taken from
revenue, Uber utilizes surge prices, which multiply revenues by some factor, and time-
based fares. Hence profits for a ride taking a passenger from l to k are
Πulk(s) = κ× s [φu + piu,1δlk + piu,2τlk]− clk
where s ≥ 1 is the surge factor and κ is the commission.26
States and Payoffs
Ultimately, the interesting behavior of the taxis in the model is the decision of where
to locate in their search for passengers. The object of interest from this model is the
state of the world S encapsulating the location of taxis and Uber at any given time
and driving this behavior. All cabs keep track of 7 sets of states. First is cab i’s own
location at t, lti for cab i. The rest of the market is captured by the count of vacant




l,u, respectively, and the count
of cabs in transit etk,g, etc., where k indexes the number of periods until the cab arrives
at its destination. Finally, the drivers keep track of the distribution of surge prices
stl . For the estimation I assume the distribution of surge prices are known in advance,
not an unreasonable assumption in the medium run if surge prices follow general daily
patterns.
Hence, the full state for any cab i is
Sti = {lti, {vtl,j}j,l, {etl,j}j,l, {stl}l}
I assume all vacant drivers have a belief on the complete state S = {Sti}i,t. While it is a
stretch to assume that taxis have knowledge of surge prices, it is more reasonable that
26 Because I do not currently model the decision of Uber as a platform, this s is taken as exogenous
and read from data by location and time of day as explained in Section 1.2.3.
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they form an expectation of it over time. Nonetheless, I do not model this dimension
of uncertainty for now. Given S, taxis can then evaluate the expected dynamic value
of any location l.

















V t+τlkk,b − clk + εk
]]
for b ∈ {x, g}. Note that C(l) is the choice set of alternative locations given a cab starts
in l. C(l) includes all adjacent, i.e. proximal, locations and l itself. The first half of the
expectation is the probability that in location l the taxi makes a match and is sent to
location k with a passenger. The second half of the expectation is the probability that it
makes no match within the time period and must make a decision about where to search
next by maximizing the net present value of profits. I allow an additive idiosyncratic
shock ε to that decision, which follows the extreme value distribution, useful both for
modeling the search choice decision and capturing unobserved heterogeneity in searches.
Uber cabs have a different value function by nature of the matching assignment
process.





















V t+τlkk,b − clk + εk
]]
The major difference is in the first term. The first probability after the summation is
the probability that an Uber in location l at t is matched to a consumer in location
k who requests a destination in k′. Two additional differences from taxis are that the
payoff from the trip depends on the surge price of the customer’s location and, even after
match is made, the driver faces a cost in traveling from location l to the pickup point
in k. The time superscripts on the continuation value are also slightly different. Taxis
are idle only during the search process. Uber drivers are idle both while searching and
while picking up passengers. These differences identify what could be one heuristic for
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how cab drivers make their decisions. A first-order concern for taxis is the probability
they will find a match in a given area. That concern is supplanted by the idle time for
an Uber driver, as described in Castillo et al. (2017).
Choice Problem and Transition Beliefs
The critical choice problem facing drivers is where to search in the event they do not
get matched in period t. Save the form of the continuation value, the decision problem
faced in Equations 1.19 and 1.20 are identical. Both unmatched Uber drivers and taxis
in location l solve the following problem
k∗ = arg max
k∈C(l)
(
V t+τlkk,j − clk + εk
)
(1.21)
where C(l) is the lists of location adjacent to l. Although the problem is the same for
j ∈ {b, u}, the motivations for moving are not. While we expect taxis to search to
maximize their probability of matching, the related incentive for an Uber driver is to
minimize the distance they would need to travel upon being matched to a consumer.
Because ε is assumed to follow the Extreme Value I distribution with scale σε, the
probability of choosing a particular search location k is given by the logit formula
σl,j(k|St) =
exp(E[V t+τlkk,j − clk|St])∑
k′∈C(l) exp(E[V
t+τlk′
k′,j − clk′ |St])
(1.22)
for a cab of type j starting in location l. For any type of cab in location l at t, then,
this function determines the optimal movement to new locations. Designate that vector
σtl,j . There are then three matrices to determine the entire transition matrix for empty
cabs σtj .
1.3.3 Equilibrium
To ensure the tractability of the model, I utilize the oblivious equilibrium concept of
Weintraub et al. (2008) adapted for the taxi industry in Buchholz (2017). I assume that
drivers of all cab types hold beliefs over competitors of all other cab types regarding
both their policy functions and spatial distribution. Along with complete knowledge of
demand and the surge price schedule, every driver can project the evolution of the state
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St over the course of the day. Let Σt denote this transition belief for the state at time
t.
The equilibrium is the set of states {St}, transition beliefs Σt, policy functions σtj
for all j and t given an initial state S0 and the total number of cabs Vj for j ∈ {x, g, u}
such that the following conditions hold
1. Taxis match in each location l at the start of period t according to Equation 1.8.
They transition according to ptlk,b once conditioned on matching. Uber drivers also
match and are assigned customers according to Equation 1.15 with transitions
conditional on contracting defined by Equation 1.16. Together these transitions
determine the aggregate movement of occupied cabs. Let ν(et+1j |etj ,mt, ptu) be the
transition kernel where etj is the distribution of cabs of type j at time t, p
t
u is
the assignment of Uber drivers to passengers across all locations, and mt are taxi
matches.
2. Vacant drivers at the end of every period move according to the solution of Equa-
tion 1.21, that is σtj(S
t, Σ˜t) based on the state and beliefs for all cab types, where
.˜ denotes beliefs. Let µ(vt+1j |vtj , σ˜tj , St) be the transition kernel of vacant taxis.
3. The realized state transition is the combined movement for employed and vacant
cabs, along with the exogenous change in surge prices, st. Hence Σ(St+1/st+1|St/st) =
ν(et+1j |etj ,mt, ptu) + µ(vt+1j |vtj , σ˜tj , St).
4. Rational expectations ensure that Σt = Σ˜t for all t.
Existence follows from the standard arguments.
1.4 Data and Estimation
Estimation of the model proceeds in three steps. Because I measure price and wait
times directly, I estimate demand separately as the first step of this procedure. I then
integrate Equations 1.4 and 1.6 into the estimation of the supply model. Finally, the
congestion and efficiency term functions are estimated at the end.
This section proceeds by describing the data and estimation procedure for demand.
It concludes by repeating the exercise for supply.
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1.4.1 Demand
Rather than modeling the transit demand for the entire city throughout the day, I make
two limitations on the scope of the estimation. The first is that I estimate the demand
system based on Monday through Thursday morning commuting patterns. The reason
for this limitation is multifold. Residency population distributions are more accurate
representations of the actual distribution of population on weekday mornings. Second,
other than what the MTA can track through card users, the census publishes the most
persistent datasets on transit choice, but those choices are limited to morning commutes.
Finally, changes to the transit system can influence a consumer’s extra-marginal decision
about making a trip. I lack the data to meaningfully estimate a model that captures
this dimension. In modeling morning commutes, which are more likely to occur with
regularity, I can mitigate this particular issue. Additionally, granular data exist linking
home and work locations. I explain extending the demand estimates beyond these
commuting times in the discussion of the supply model.
The second limitation reduces the geographic scope of the estimation. Its purpose
is simply to avoid areas with near zero shares of taxi users. Figure 1.12 shows the
extent of the coverage. In total 129 taxi zones, or 350 census tracts, are included. One
concern is that these areas are some of the most dense in the city. Because the matching
efficiency for taxis will be estimated for each zone in the supply section, it should not
bias those estimates. Results reported over measures of density, however, will obviously
be truncated to these higher density locations.
This model is not one of a daily choice problem for each consumer. Rather, as
details of the data sources lay out, I model the typical choice a consumer would make
on her way to work. The major assumption is that the demand parameters governing
the consumer problem for morning commute trips will also apply to any another trips
taken in the day.27
27 This assumption is not entirely out of left field, but a particular concern is that, say, consumers
are more wait time elastic in their choices for the morning commute.
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Data Sources
Three sources of data constitute the consumer choice data for the demand estimation.
The first is the 2008 New York Customer Travel Survey conducted by the Metropoli-
tan Transportation Authority (MTA) over the period of May through November 2008.
While the period covered is long before the key time period of interest in mid-2016,
the dataset offers more extensive details on transit behavior and rider demographics
than any other available.28 The survey provides the typical work transit mode of over
10, 000 people living in the five boroughs of New York. In addition to their transit choice
the survey takers indicate the census tract of their home and work, time of departure,
and income bracket. These observations are designated M = {Mi}N1i=1.
The next set of choice data, from the American Community Survey, allow for the
construction of choice shares at the temporospatial divisions outlined in the model
section. The 5-year surveys report estimates of transit choice by the time of departure
in 30-minute to 1-hour blocks and by census tract. I require the construction of shares
for two time periods, 2008 and 2015.29 I can then aggregate the tract data up to
the taxi-zone level. The long horizon in calculating the estimates of these shares is the
principal disadvantage in using this dataset. In an environment I have speculated has
changed significantly over the past several years, 5-year estimates dampen the extent
of the transformation. Additionally, the ACS does report taxi service usage but does
not distinguish between different types of taxis. These observations are designated
B = {Bi}N2i=1.
To augment the ACS data, the final set of choice data utilizes the yellow, green, and
Uber pickup data from the TLC already exhibited elsewhere in the paper. As alluded
to in the discussion of the other datasets, I favor this source over the ACS for its ability
to differentiate between traditional taxis and Uber and the potential to take advantage
of daily variations in the characteristics — and choice — of these two products. These
variations are arguably more subject to change from day to day than those impacting
the choice to take public transit or walk. The unfortunate shortcoming is that I am
28 Future versions of this paper will certainly take advantage of updated transit surveys. The National
Household Travel Survey for 2016 to ’17 is slated for release in 2018, for example. The ACS Public Use
Microdata Sample also includes rich demographics but obscures home and work locations in geographies
too large to be useful in this context.
29 The 2015 data can be updated to 2016 as soon as the Census Bureau releases it in late 2017.
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unable to distinguish work commuters from other passengers. In the main body of the
paper I attempt to tease out which rides are morning commutes, the details of which
are in Appendix A.1.4.30 I use observations from the end of March 2016 through
June 2016, corresponding to the period during which I collected characteristic data for
Uber rides, and designate these observations K = {Ki}N3i=1. A summary of these data
sources is in Table 1.2.
The observable trip characteristics in the demand model are travel times, walking
distance, price, and wait times. Nearly every characteristic depends on the starting
location, the destination, and the time of departure. Consider a taxi trip I observed at
9:00AM from location l to location k. Of the menu of choices, the only characteristics
read off data are the price and traveling time for the taxi. Every other characteristic
must be simulated. Table 1.3 summarizes which characteristics are observed or simu-
lated when the choice is the observed choice.
To simulate travel times for any choice, I use a mix of OpenTripPlanner and a
separately built graph of NYC’s road network. OpenTripPlanner provides directions
similar to Google Maps, but trips can be planned around an arbitrary public transit
schedule. Since my data are now historic, this feature was important to accurately
reflect the contemporaneous schedules. Appendix A.1.5 further details its usage and
application to vehicle-based choices. I also use this program to gauge walking distances.
I assume for vehicle-based choices that the walking distance is negligible.
Prices and wait times are the final characteristics and the only two observable char-
acteristics differentiating Uber from taxis. Prices for public transit are calculated using
contemporaneous prices along each route simulated. Section 1.2 described the process
for gathering price and wait times for taxis and Uber. The route planner also generates
wait times for public transit options.
An additional assumption I impose on the data is that all Uber rides I observe are
through UberX, the most popular choice at the time. Although I collected price and
wait time for all of Uber’s choice offerings in New York City, The TLC dataset does not
distinguish which type of Uber passengers used to complete a particular ride.
The final sources to address concern individual characteristics, destinations, and
30 In future robustness tests I will check the impact on the demand parameters by dropping this
filtering.
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income. I simulate income at the census tract level — sub-geographies of taxi zones —
using 5-year ACS data. I use the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD)
Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (LODES) for 2014 to simulate home tract-
to-work tract commute flows for later periods, and the Census Transportation Planning
Product (CTPP) estimated based on ACS data from 2006 to 2010 for the 2008 period.
These two datasets are used to empirically estimate the origin-destination matrix γ(l, k).
Estimation Procedure
To estimate the model in Section 1.3, I require a few additional assumptions. First, I
assume εij are iid across individuals but multivariate normal across products, following
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or εi ∼ MVN(0,Ω), introducing an additional six demand parameters. I depart from
the standard logit setup because of the striking and close substitution from yellow taxis
to Uber laid out Section 1.2. The second assumption, worth restating here, is that
(θd,Ω) govern preferences in all time periods covered.
Given the first assumption I can calculate predicted shares for each market, here
defined as 30-minute blocks (t) for each of the taxi zones (l) covered in Figure 1.12
for each separate month in March to June 2016. For each taxi zone l, ns individuals
are simulated for each census tract, so each taxi zone is partitioned by census tracts
l = {l1, . . . , ln}. Income is drawn independently for each of the simulated consumers ac-
cording to the distribution fli(di), where di is the vector of indicators for income bracket
in the census tract. The desired destination tract ki is also drawn independently based
on γ(li, ki), pinned down empirically with data described in the previous section. Each
of the ns individuals is then assigned a time-of-departure block by weights generated
from ACS data. Let pitl (l
i) be the fraction of departures in time block t originating from
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tract li. Given (θd,Ω), predicted market shares for the zone are













with the integral computation here over the MVN idiosyncratic errors.
I proceed with the standard technique introduced by Berry (1994) to “concentrate
out” {ξtj(l)}j , the unobserved choice taste parameters for each market. Shares are con-
structed for these markets in 2008 and 2016 using the ACS data and denoted qt,DATAl (j).
Before the inversion, I make a slight alteration to Equation 1.1 to account for a
peculiarity with the wait times. For taxis and Uber the wait time is independent
of the destination. I split up wait time into two additive components wj(l, l
′) =
[djwj(l) + (1− dj)wj(l, l′)], where dj is an indicator for a taxi-like choice. I can then
define δj(l; θd,Ω) = βwdjwj(l) + ξj(l). Typically, the Berry inversion carries the extra
value of reducing the parameter space by the terms linear in δ. In this case βw still
remains in the form βw(1−dj)wj(l, l′), but, the inversion still plays two important roles
in this estimation. First, isolating w for taxis and Uber in a linear equation introduces
an opportunity to instrument wait times to handle with endogeneity concerns. Unfor-
tunately, the same technique cannot be used with price — price is always a function
of the starting point and destination — but controlling for the component of the error,
a location-time-specific taste for Uber, that is likely correlated with price can mitigate
endogeneity concerns if not directly address it. For all other transit choices, prices and
wait times should not be meaningfully responsive to these unobserved tastes.
The Berry technique in this case requires the restriction that shares in the data
match predicted shares from the model at the half-hour, taxi-zone block level. That is,
qt,DATAl (j)− qtl (j; θd,Ω, δ) = 0 ∀j, l, t (1.25)
Berry (1994) demonstrates that for each (θd,Ω), there exists a unique δ(θd,Ω) for Equa-
tion 1.25 to hold. Given this restriction I utilize four sets of moments to identify the
demand parameters.
The first set of moments are the score of a maximum simulated likelihood estimator
using the travel survey data M . Unlike the following sets of moments, these are less
34







wi ∗ log qi (j(i); θd,Ω)
where wi is the sample weight for observation i. The score of the log likelihood function












The next set of moments match aggregate income statistics in the ACS by commuting
choice, similar to the matching moments used in Petrin (2002). In its 5-year data the
ACS reports a breakdown of transit choices by income. The sample statistics to match
are read straight off the data and denoted by
qˆlikj ≡ qˆli (incomer ∈ [ℵk,ℵk+1]|r uses option j for transit)
for location li. Let the population analog be µlikj . The corresponding statistics gener-
ated by aggregate model predictions are derived by the following equation.













for the simulated individuals r corresponding to tract li. The moment restriction im-
poses that at the true parameter the model’s aggregated statistic and the population
should be equal.
E[ψ2(θd0,Ω0, Bi)] ≡
µlikj − qlikj(incomer ∈ [ℵk,ℵk+1]|r uses option j for transit; θd0,Ω0) = 0 (1.27)
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for all j, k and tracts.
The third set takes advantage of the much richer data for taxi and Uber usage,
relative to the other transit options. The set roughly attempts to pin down the elements
of Ω. The first method tracks unexpected disturbances in the subway lines — historic
records are available for most Manhattan lines — that create delays (and hence wait
times) for commuters who would typically take the subway.31 For those days I
measure the substitution toward taxis and Uber. Denote ∆ˆelj the change in the share
of j ∈ Taxi, Uber from the change in wait time on the subway, that is an empirical
measure of the cross wait elasticity without holding fixed all the other factors likely to
have changed from the disturbance day e. Let ∆elj(θd,Ω) be the same measure from the
model replicating the observed characteristics from the event day. On average over all
events E, these measures should match.
The second method utilizes day-to-day variation in the wait times between taxi and
Uber. The procedure follows the same set up as the subway method. Here, I define an
event — these are more uncommon than subway delays — as deviations from long-term
average wait times for taxi cabs. I estimate an empirical measure of the cross wait




∆ˆelj −∆elj(θd,Ω) = 0 (1.28)
The final set of moments are simply instruments on the wait time in the linear
equation for δ(θd,Ω). I adapt instruments from Frechette et al. (2016) and measure
average traffic speeds in rings one and two zones away from each location l at the
specified time block t, denoted Ztl .
32 These traffic speeds should be correlated with
wait times of both Uber and taxis but not otherwise affecting the choice. Hence,
E[ψ4(θd0,Ω0, Bi)] ≡ E[ξtlj(θd0,Ω0)Ztlj ] = 0 (1.29)
31 Note also this time period is before disturbances were the exception not the rule.
32 Relevant comments I received in seminars and hope to include in future iterations of this paper
are better instruments to put here. First, as I argue in this very paper, traffic speeds impact demand. A
better instrument would be unexpected changes to traffic speeds, like through accidents. Alternatively
it is well documented how weather acts like a supply shifter in this market.
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for all l, t and j ∈ {Taxi, Uber} where ξtlj(θ) is the value of ξ implied from the share
inversion for a given value of θ.
GMM Estimator
The sets of moments can be stacked into a single vector. Formally, it is assumed that
θd0,Ω0 uniquely satisfies






 = 0 (1.30)
with sample analog ψˆ(θd,Ω,M,B,K). The GMM estimate (θˆd, Ωˆ) is the solution the
following criterion function




where W is the weighting matrix derived via Hansen (1982). To calculate standard
errors, I follow the adjustment on the standard formula offered by Goolsbee and Petrin
(2004) to manage sampling errors in the observed market shares.
1.4.2 Supply
Data and Setting
For the supply estimation I focus on the area covered by the demand estimation, illus-
trated in Figure 1.12. While I could extend the coverage area, limiting myself and the
cabs to these locations allows me to most fully take advantage of the demand derived
from the first stage of the estimation. The day is played out over the course of 5-minute
periods from 6am to 4pm Monday through Friday every month of March through June
2016. I assume all taxis play the same strategy for a time period in a given month.
To account for the fact that Uber is still expanding over the time period, particularly
outside of Manhattan, I re-solve for the relative demand of taxis and Uber using the
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available price and wait data each month. Location-time-level unobserved preferences
are assumed fixed for the entire period.
Extending the results from the demand model to apply here requires one additional
assumption. The unobserved demand tastes ξtj(l) for each transportation type are only
estimated for times covered by the demand model, that is up to noon. Since the greatest
volatility in these values is across l rather than t within a fixed month, I substitute in
the average unobserved taste for each location l beyond noon. In future robustness
work, I can limit the supply analysis to the first half of the day at the expense of forcing
taxis out of their shifts artificially early.
The second complication to address is the matter of total supply on the road for
the various services. Yellow taxis follow the standard 5 to 5 work shift, the timing of
which motivates the daily 6am to 4pm simulation. Based on advertisements for green
cab shift partners on the website nycitycab.com, I assume green cabs largely follow the
same shift pattern. The TLC also publishes records for the average green and yellow
cabs on the road for each month, a record that I use as the assumed number of cabs
under operation that month.
Uber drivers, on the other hand, have flexible shifts. The number of cabs on the
road weekly is bounded on the high end by TLC reports indicating the unique vehicle
dispatches from each of the FHV bases in New York, including the Uber bases. Consid-
ering the result in Hall and Krueger (2015) that as of 2014 nearly 42% of NYC UberX
drivers drive less than 15 hours a week — barely a full shift — anything close to the
upper bound as the number of Uber vehicles on the road during the day would be any
overestimate. Instead I look to the pickup data itself to form a first guess at a bound
on supply. I look for the maximal simultaneous (within 5 minutes) pickups on a day
and average it for the month. Approximating the “consistent” supply on the road Vu,
however, is built into the estimation procedure.
There are several components of the model I can directly construct using data.
First γt(l, k), the transition probability for time t I treat differently in this section than
the last. Since the period of interest covers more than morning commutes, I need an
approximation of destination preferences outside the time period. Relying on the fact
that Uber and taxis are close substitutes, I estimate γt(l, k) using old yellow and green
taxi data from 2013 before Uber took a chunk out of their businesses. In areas outside
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of Manhattan the precision of these estimates decline with the observed trips taken.
However, as detailed in the model section, riders are not indifferent between Uber and
taxi conditional on a destination. I use the current demand model to pin down their
relative preference.
The other model parameters read from data are profits. Travel distances are ap-
proximated by observed taxi rides between locations, as are travel times. While travel
times are determined in the model, for the estimation these travel times are estimated
using actual travel times read from the taxi data. The cost of operation scales with
distances traveled and by mile is the average monthly fuel cost against the average fuel
economy of the taxi fleet. The final component for profits are surge prices for Uber.
The estimation period is precisely the time for which I collected surge prices from the
Uber app, March to June 2016. Finally, I assume τ¯ in Equation 1.14 is 16, based on
the observation in data that no wait time for Uber was ever over 16 minutes. Finally,
the commission rate for Uber, κ = 0.238, is based on the estimates reported in Castillo
et al. (2017), which uses data from Uber in Manhattan.
Estimation
For a given vector of parameters θs = (σε, {αtl}, {Q˜tl}, Vu) I need to solve the equilibrium.
Here, I follow the oblivious equilibrium procedure developed under Weintraub et al.
(2008) to significantly simplify this procedure.
I assume the city is serviced by enough of every type of taxi to treat them as a
continuum. Under this assumption transition probabilities become deterministic; the
predicted transition paths throughout the day are thus also deterministic. The value of
this insight from the oblivious equilibrium literature is that every driver need not keep
track of or have beliefs on the behavior of all drivers when making their own search
decisions. Instead each driver makes decisions conditional on industry averages.
Let S0 = {St0}t be the initial guess of the state with Sr the state for each iteration
of the algorithm. Denote mtl,j the matches of type j in location l. The only adaptation
to the algorithm from Buchholz (2017) is to check for convergence of all taxi types and
Uber.
To derive Q˜ for a guess of the parameters {θs/Q˜tl}, I feed a guess to the Equilibrium
Algorithm and use the distribution of taxis (not Uber) to invert Q˜ from Equation 1.8.
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Algorithm 1: Equilibrium Algorithm
1 Set r = 0 and Q˜ = Q˜0 generated by the fixed point algorithm described





T ) for all j ∈ {x, g, u}
3 for t = T − 1 to 1 do






5 for t=1 to T-1 do
6 Derive σr(k|Str) for all t, j, l
7 Realized transitions and σ yield the actual state S˜t+1
8 Update the state St+1r+1 for the next period using S˜
t+1
9 Update continuation values V t+1j (S
t+1
r+1)
10 Set r = r + 1
11 end
12 end
13 while |V tj,r − V tj,r−1| > ε ∀t, j do
14 Repeat 4 to 11
15 end
I repeat the process to convergence.
For the other parameters {θs/Q˜tl} I use simulated method of moments. I match the
average vacancy time for cabs, the utilization rate, and wait times. Uber wait times and
the average utilization rate taken from Cramer and Krueger (2016) address the scale of
Uber. The more vehicles on the road, the lower the utilization rate, for a given level of
rides. But, clearly wait times also change as a function of the number of Uber drivers on
the road. Since demand in this portion of the estimation is not responsive to changes in
wait times approximated by the model (but rather the wait times in data), more Uber
cabs should unambiguously decrease wait times.
In Section 1.3 I detailed how matching probabilities are linked to wait times. Because
these wait times are estimated in terms of periods, I convert it to a continuous value
by assuming that the probability of being matched within any five-minute period t is
uniform conditional on being matched in that period. Matching taxi wait times pins
down αtl . To estimate the function for α
t
l , I assume a simple form for Equation 1.9







where t indexes the time and θt is a vector of time-of-day dummies. Additionally, the
number of matches are adjusted for the street access area of the location. βdens should
capture the relationship of transactional density with matching efficiency, while αl is
a location fixed effect that may pick up factors like street layout. The nature of the
market helps identify this density term; near the green exclusion border there is an
artificial glut of supply from the green taxis. Figure 1.13 demonstrates a large drop off
in the share of Uber pickups around the green exclusion border. Assuming conditions
are similar around the border, this hints at a larger available supply from competitors,
in particular green and yellow taxis.
Finally, I estimate the congestion function from Equation 1.18 after assuming the
following form












l,j) for j ∈ {x, g, u}. Each route between proximal zones can have
a separate intercept, which I estimate as a fixed effect.
1.5 Results and Discussion
1.5.1 Model Estimates
The parameter estimates from the model appear in several tables and figures in the
Appendix. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the result of the demand-side estimation. Table 1.6
presents the result for the estimated volume of Uber cabs, the degree of uncertainty σε
governing the location decision of taxi and Uber drivers, and the estimate of transaction
density on efficiency αdens.
A few validating and interesting facts emerge from the demand estimates alone.
First, price elasticities, as conventional wisdom would posit, diminish with income.
This fairly general pattern is reflected in the estimates for αg in Table 1.4. Additionally,
consumers do not value all time equally. Consumers penalize waiting time much more
significantly than travel time, a finding reflected in transportation literature. Finally,
the off-diagonal components in Table 1.5 reflect inherent substitutability of different
transit choices. Expectedly, Uber and taxis have the highest degree of substitutability
even controlling for the fact that the quality of service they offer, in terms of price and
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wait time, is already quite similar in most areas of the city.
Figure 1.14 is another attempt at validating the results from the demand estimation.
The figure maps the average taxi wait time elasticity in each taxi zone covered by the
estimation. Quite sensibly, the areas with better substitutes have the highest elasticities
along the dimension of wait time . This pattern also appears to be reflected down the
central axis of Manhattan where most of the subway lines run. This figure, in part,
previews one part of the value of Uber in different parts of the city. In Manhattan
consumers can easily substitute away from Uber were it to disappear. In other areas of
the city, where Uber has a larger share of traffic, we would expect these consumers to
be hit by both a much sharper drop in the market quality (along wait time) and also
have a lower wait elasticity.
The final supply results are presented in Figure 1.15 and should be taken along
with the result that αdens = .0048. These figure maps the residual parameters (αl)
from Equation 1.31 over building to ground density with values normalized by the
maximum. Despite controlling for transactional density, I still find corr(αl, densityl) >
0.33 The residual values range from 0.34 to 1.32. To get a sense of their meaning fix
the transactional density at 0, and suppose an area had 100 potential and 100 potential
cabs. In the location with αl = 0.34, we would expect 29 matches. In the location with
αl = 1.32, we would predict only 73.5 matches.
To account for the role of transactional density in efficiency via αdens, consider the
zone with the most transactions per unit area per 5 minutes. Appropriately, this zone
contains Penn Station, which has anywhere from 50 to over 250 pickups per 5 minute
period per square mile over the course of the day. αl for this zone is 0.92. Absent any
transactional density, the matching function would predict 60 matches with 100 cabs
and 100 consumers. Ignoring time of day effects, the predicted matches accounting for
the transactional density ranges from 68 to 88. Hence the transactional density alone
improves efficiency in a particular area by 20%. All other zones, by definition, do not
receive close to the same boost in efficiency from transactional density.
33 Earlier versions of the paper in which I set αtl = αl exhibited a much stronger correlation.
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1.5.2 Welfare Analysis and Counterfactuals
The supply results alone in Figure 1.15 combined with the impact of transactional
density present a stark estimate of the relative advantage Uber’s technology might have
over taxis. This section attempts to determine the significance of this relative advantage
from the perspective of consumers across different parts of the market. I then tease out
the importance of Uber’s different matching regime in servicing the city through a
series of counterfactuals that change the regulatory burden on yellow taxis. Finally, I
consider a set of regulations geared toward leveling the playing field between taxis and
Uber through geographic restrictions and congestion taxes. Table 1.7 summarizes the
spatially heterogenous results of the counterfactuals separated out by density quantiles.
First, to avoid having all welfare results depend too heavily on the supply model, I
carry out a standard welfare analysis dependent solely on the estimated demand model.
Following the tactic of Petrin (2002), I treat Uber as a new product category introduced
to the market by the period of analysis in March to June 2016. I compare the welfare
of consumers choosing Uber to their alternative in a baseline year 2013, when I assume
Uber is still an small platform in the market. Technically, Uber entered New York in
May 2011, but, as I argued in Section 2, the scope of the operation even as late as early
2014 was negligible compared to yellow taxis. Finally, I break down the compensating
variation per ride for each of the 143 zones in the analysis.
In extrema, these compensating variation values range from $1.00 per ride in eastern
Queens, where it is approximately 10% of revenue from the ride, to $.10 per ride in
central Manhattan, where it is approximately 2% of revenue from the ride. Figure 1.16
illustrates the range of results for all the zones in the study over a map of the city.
Figure 1.17 depicts the same information smoothed out over the measure of geographic
density. In total the change in consumer surplus per day for these riders works out to
be $73,000 for an average total of 120,000 transactions per day, a factor of 10 difference
from the estimates in Cohen et al. (2016).34 In Table 1.7, the results from the exercise
34 I cannot directly assess the contrast in these findings. One theoretical difference, however, is in the
demand model used to generate price elasticities. My paper estimates demand on longer term transit
choice decisions, which should yield consumers with higher price elasticity than in Cohen et al. (2016).
Higher price elasticity would also translate to a lower consumer surplus. Second, this work demonstrates
that where in a city consumers are sampled can impact one’s estimate of the value of Uber (or any new
transit option).
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are recorded under “C1”.
Taxi Entry Policy Counterfactuals
The counterfactual exercises proceed in a series of steps to understand the importance
of Uber’s technology itself, versus its relatively high level of supply, in providing service
to different markets in the city. For every counterfactual I start from the previous
baseline and “shock” the system with the particular regulatory adjustment for that
counterfactual. Unlike in the supply estimation, demand and supply interact with each
other in the determination of the new equilibrium. I handle this problem through the
following algorithm.
Algorithm 2: Counterfactual Algorithm
1 Shock the system with a regulatory change, e.g. eliminating Uber
2 Holding fixed the demand system, allow cabs to re-optimize their location
decisions
3 Re-calculate the wait times and congestion based on these decisions
4 Feed the wait times and travel times back into the demand system and allow
consumers to re-optimize
5 Repeat 2-4 until convergence
Three remaining issues are unaccounted for in these counterfactuals. The first is
the potential evolution of unobserved tastes for taxis once the regulatory change has
been applied. I simply hold these unobserved tastes fixed at the average daily level
per taxi zone as of June 2016. The second issue is that I have no proof guaranteeing
convergence. While computationally that has not been issue at the current parameter
values, I intend to address this potential problem in the future. Finally, a multiplicity
of equilibria are a near certainty in this setting because of the feedback from demand
to supply and vice versa. I am only presenting one potential new equilibrium. Future
robustness work may require testing the sensitivity of the equilibria.
The first of these counterfactuals (“C2” in Table 1.7) is meant to replicate the results
of the previous welfare analysis conducted, along with simulating the now unlikely
possibility of banning Uber in New York as London has done. I ban Uber as of March
2016 and re-solve the model. The welfare changes here approximate those from the
demand-based analysis and serve as a sanity check for using the supply model in further
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counterfactuals. Figure 1.18 maps the relative difference in the calculations across the
zones in the city. While the qualitative pattern of the welfare patterns is somewhat
different than the in the baseline welfare calculation, the quartile averages across density
groups are fairly similar. The results do suggest, however, that modeled congestion, as
a countervailing force against taxis congregating in the densest areas of the city, may be
too strong. Compared to models without congestion in earlier versions of the paper, the
calculated compensating variation in Manhattan is higher and likewise lower outside
Manhattan. Looking at the change in rides, the percentage declines (or in the best
case, growth) in Manhattan are worse than before. Congestion pushes taxi cabs out of
attractive dense locations, and, in this case, that effect could be over shooting the real
impact.35
The final counterfactual (“C3” in Table 1.7) in this section asks how many yellow
taxis would be needed to at least match the service quality (gauged by wait time)
consumers have in the initial data. I again carry out this counterfactual by adding
a stock of yellow taxis weighted by the initial distribution of cabs from the previous
counterfactual. Because of network externalities there are infinite possible equilibria
resulting from this regulatory change. I choose to handle it by adding an additional 500
taxis, allow the model to reach an equilibrium, and I then add the next 500. Ultimately, I
find New York City would require 32,000 additional yellow taxis; note that this quantity
is greater than the 21,356 Uber cabs previously servicing the market.36 The result
is born from two factors. First, enough yellow taxis must enter the densest markets to
make the less dense markets relatively more appealing. Additionally, because of yellow
taxis’ technological disadvantage in the outer boroughs, more are required to achieve the
same level of service quality from the baseline number of Uber cabs.37 Finally, note
that this analysis makes no claim about the profitability of these routes. Depending on
the outside options for these drivers, the market may never achieve this level service
even were the regulatory cap on yellow taxis to completely disappear.
35 In earlier versions of the paper, not accounting for congestion, the difference was larger across
quartiles. The convergence across the specifications is encouraging evidence of the supply framework.
On the other hand the qualitative patterns of benefits diverge more than in previous models.
36 Without congestion this estimate approached 36,500.
37 A corollary counterfactual in the works is redoing this problem but adding only “green” taxis.
Green taxis eliminate the first factor driving up this number; that is their service starts in less dense
markets.
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1.5.3 Counterfactuals on Uber Restrictions and a Congestion Tax
For the counterfactuals in this section, I consider a set of less draconian policies geared
toward evening the playing field between Uber and taxis. As I discussed in Section 1.2
Uber’s unfair regulatory advantage stems from being able to pick up passengers in
Manhattan at no additional cost. The old technology requires a high fee to pick up
in these areas through the medallion system. Hence, in the section I simulate two
counterfactuals: one in which Uber is banned from picking up in the green exclusion
zone. The other implements a tax on pickups for Uber for every pickup in the green
exclusion zone.
The simulation of these counterfactuals is slightly different than for the previous set.
Obviously, both Uber and taxis are searching in the city simultaneously. Because Uber
continues to operate, I need an additional assumption on counterfactual surge prices.
For now, I assume that the surge pricing scheme stays constant. Future iterations will
estimate a surge price function much like the for congestion in Equation 1.18.
In the first counterfactual Uber is banned from picking up in the green exclusion
zone. Because the goal of this exercise is to assess how much Uber relies on Manhattan
to “subsidize” its operations in the outer boroughs, I introduce an additional profit
condition in the algorithm, described below. The welfare results of the simulation are
Algorithm 3: CF Algorithm Banning Uber from Manhattan
1 while the current average profit of Uber drivers is less than the original average
profit do
2 Remove 100 Uber drivers
3 Shock the system with the regulatory change
4 Holding fixed the demand system, allow cabs and Uber to re-optimize their
location decisions
5 Re-calculate the wait times and congestion based on these decisions
6 Feed the wait times and travel times back into the demand system and allow
consumers to re-optimize
7 end
reported by density quantile in Table 1.7 as “C4”. A naive baseline for the findings
would be to claim that 50% of the Uber drivers would exit the market after the imple-
mentation of the Manhattan ban, since, as of June 2016, about half of Uber pickups
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are in Manhattan. The ban has a further effect, however, as not being able to pick up
in Manhattan makes traveling from Bronx to the other boroughs, or vice versa, more
expensive in expectation to Uber drivers because of the higher idle time. As a result,
Queens and Brooklyn actually enjoy a higher quantity of Uber while Bronx dispropor-
tionately suffers. In the end 65% of Uber drivers exit the market. While the result does
suggest a disproportionate revenue value from access to the dense Manhattan market,
part of the result is mixed in with the value of Manhattan as a low-idle time bridge
between the boroughs.38 More importantly, the high cost to Manhattan consumers
— the welfare cost mirrors that in the C2 — suggests there might be room for a tax
not born entirely by Uber drivers, as I propose in the final counterfactual.
The final counterfactual implements a tax on Uber for pickups in the green exclusion
zone. For a given tax level, I calculate the new equilibrium as in the previous algorithm.
I adjust the tax searching over a discrete grid of $0.10 increments starting from $1.00.
For simplicity I assume the tax incidence fall on the drivers, that is Uber does not adjust
its prices. I continue to raise the tax until the shift revenue of yellow taxis matches the
level from June 2013, an approximately $100 difference.39 The welfare results are
reported in Table 1.7 as “C5.” Ultimately, the algorithm settles on a tax of $2.50. Like
in the previous counterfactual the areas hurt most by the policy are those in the outer
areas of the city, even though the tax does not target them. The tax, however, functions
similar to a ban in that the revenue value to Uber drivers from access to Manhattan is,
by design, dampened.
1.5.4 Concluding Comment
Underpinning all these results is the relative advantage and disadvantage of a hailing
taxi’s technology to Uber’s dispatching system across markets of varying density. Taken
together they offer an answer to the question underlying this paper: has Uber’s success
been born from “technology” or its ability to field supply in a way traditional taxis are
often prohibited from doing? In New York City, the answer is clear; it depends on the
38 Another valuable counterfactual would be to allow Uber drivers to pay a fee for access to Manhat-
tan. This set up parallels the congestion tax in the final counterfactual and also more cleanly assesses
the value of this Manhattan subsidy.
39 An alternative planner might adjust the tax with actual concern for congestion. In the future I
could run the same procedure to have traffic speeds reach parity with June 2013 levels. I find average
difference of around 3mph.
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density of the market. In New York’s densest markets, Uber offers little if any advantage
with its technology; unobservable consumer preference — which may be indeed be a
knowable characteristic Uber manipulates but I cannot measure — drives consumers to
its platform. Yellow taxi service could itself yield the same quality rides. Elsewhere,
the old hailing technology is simply insufficient to service the market at the same level
of efficiency as Uber or similar services; the counterfactual illustrating the much higher
quantity of yellow taxis required to match the baseline service demonstrates this result.
The second set of counterfactuals highlight a separate result about the benefits from
Uber. First in cities of densities similar to the outer boroughs, assuming all other transit
options the same, the benefit from Uber would likely be lower. These cities would not
benefit from the high revenue value rooted in denser areas. On the other hand, Uber
has the ability to adjust the costs to drivers in each of these markets. Extending these
results to other markets thus remains an open problem. The corollary is that the clear
cut case of business stealing I presented in Section 1.2 is less evident at the level of the
whole market. The rents extracted from old taxi drivers in Manhattan are, in part,
transferred to consumers in the outer boroughs.
1.6 Conclusion
Uber is the face of a sea change in the transportation industry. Uber’s incredible inroads
into the historically stagnant taxi market serves as decent evidence of this perspective.
How beneficial the new technology in matching consumers Uber has brought to the
market, however, is an open question. On the surface the ability to hail a taxi from a
phone is but an incremental change to traditional dispatch services. This paper proposes
that the size of the benefit offered by Uber’s technology is a function of the density
of the market it is serving. In the densest of markets hail taxi services, which match
consumers to drivers through physical contact, can actually generate lower waiting times
for consumers than Uber’s dispatching program. Using New York City as the context,
I find that the introduction of Uber to the market has consumer welfare benefits that
vary by a factor of ten from the most dense to least dense locations studied.
To study the development of the market I use publicly available trip-level data on
the pickups of taxis and for-hire vehicles like Uber. These rich records permit a study
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of the New York City market over both space and time. I augment this dataset with
two unique sources on consumer wait times for Uber and taxis. In the first I scraped
the Uber app on a simulated Android phone to collect wait time and surge price data
for that service in 47 locations across the city at different times of day. For taxis I
follow Frechette et al. (2016) in using the pickup data to estimate a measure of the time
consumers wait for taxis. The data allow me to estimate a discrete choice of model
of demand for multiple types of transportation services in the city and imbed it in a
spatial equilibrium supply model in which Uber and taxis simultaneously. Controlling
for spatial heterogeneity in demand for Uber and taxis and the quality of alternative
transit options is critical in separating out the effects of market density from other
conflating factors.
The relative technological advantage of Uber in less dense areas manifests itself in
several ways. First, the estimated consumer surplus per ride from Uber in the least
dense areas of the city outweigh those in the most dense by a factor of ten. In terms
of revenue from this rides, the consumer surplus ranges 2% to 10%. Second, if indeed
Uber had no technological advantage over taxis, one could remove the supply cap from
yellow and green taxis and acquire a similar level of service, as measured by wait times.
I explore this possibility in two counterfactuals easing the supply cap on yellow cabs
in the absence of Uber. The results from both suggest that a much higher volume of
yellow taxi capital would be required in the market to provide the same level of service
to the outer boroughs, the less dense parts of NYC, as Uber had as of June 2016.
The paper also opens the door to several more specific questions about Uber but
also the innovations in the transportation market at large. Notably, this paper does
not account for other technological differences between Uber and alternative services
including other app-based competitors. For example, how much does the quick drop-in,
drop-out system of supply specifically contribute to the welfare generated by Uber? The
advantage from this system may exist independent of density. This paper also skirts
around the critical question of the magnitude of scale economies in these markets, as
demonstrated by Bian (2017). With more reliable data on the supply side for Uber,
the framework developed in this paper could easily be extended to reliably answer that
question. How easy it is to achieve scale is relevant to further understanding the nature
of free entry in this market. Will new entrants eventually drive platform profits to zero?
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Alternatively Uber’s early expansion through ample financial capital may have been its
true advantage and given the company an insurmountable advantage.
Using the framework developed in this paper, however, a number of additional ap-
plications are already under development. The first was accounting for the impact of
supply growth on congestion. New York has already begun considering implementing
a congestion tax to deal with perceived problems of traffic growth from ride-sharing
services in the city. This work includes preliminary results incorporating congestion
into service quality through transit times and assessing the impact of such a policy.
The second extension is modeling the e-hail technology in use by an increasing num-
ber of taxis. In Israel, for example, Gett is exclusively an app that links consumers to
existing taxis. As the use of this technology grows, the differences between taxis and
Uber diminish, but the latter still has the principal advantage of being a flexible and
centralized platform. In the context of what this paper can do, I can isolate the role




Figure 1.1: Exclusion Zones for Taxi Service in NYC
Note: Divisions in the map are different taxi zones, the unit of analysis for most of
the paper. The exclusion zone for Green cabs is the hatched area over Manhattan.
Green cabs additionally cannot serve as “hail” cabs at JFK and LaGuardia. Pickups
at these locations must be pre-arranged. In the non-exclusionary zone — save the
airports — green cabs can pick up street hails.
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Figure 1.2: Monthly Pickups by Cab Type
Note: The two vertical lines denote, respectively, the introduction of green taxis in August
2013 and the availability of FHV data in January 2015. Lyft and Uber entered the NYC
market before January 2015 but FHV data are only available continuously at this date.
Therefore, the total pickups are measured consistently before and after January 2015 but not
across that date.
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Figure 1.3: Monthly Pickups by Cab Type and Zone
(a) Pickups in the Green Cab Exclusion Zone
(b) Pickups Outside the Green Cab Exclusion Zone
Note: The two vertical lines denote, respectively, the introduction of green taxis in August
2013 and the availability of FHV data in January 2015. Lyft and Uber entered the NYC
market before January 2015 but FHV data are only available continuously at this date.
Therefore, the total pickups are measured consistently before and after January 2015 but not
across that date.
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Figure 1.4: Comparison of Uber and Taxi Price and Wait Times
(a) Price, Williamsburg to Times Square (b) Wait, Williamsburg
(c) Price, Times Square to JFK (d) Wait, Times Square
(e) Price, Penn Station to JFK (f) Wait, Penn Station
Note: The image contrasts prices and wait times for Uber (solid line) and taxis
(dotted line) in different areas of the city. Times Square and Penn Station are stand
ins for “dense” parts of the city. Williamsburg represents a less dense part of the
city. Taxi prices are read from data. Uber prices are estimated using the recorded
surge and the median trip time and distance for rides at that time of day. Taxi
wait times are estimated via the process described in the text. Uber wait times are
the average wait recorded from weekday trips at that time.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of the Relative Price of Uber and Taxi, 2015
(a) Rides from Lincoln Square East (b) Rides from Midtown Center
(c) Rides from Union Square (d) Rides from the Upper East Side South
Note: Each graph presents the frequency distribution of the ratio of Uber prices
to taxi prices for trips originating in the specified location. A dotted line appears
at 1.0 where the two prices are equal. The mass of the plot above 1.0 are trips
which would have been more expensive to take with Uber than with taxi. For each
location Uber prices are estimated using the realized trip distance and time for
rides in the taxi trip records. The surge price profile uses averages calculated for
each weekday and hour, but from 2016. These estimated prices are compared to
total fares, including tip, from realized trips in the taxi trip records.
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of the Relative Price of Uber and Taxi, 2016
(a) Rides from Lincoln Square East (b) Rides from Midtown Center
(c) Rides from Union Square (d) Rides from the Upper East Side South
Note: Each graph presents the frequency distribution of the ratio of Uber prices
to taxi prices for trips originating in the specified location. A dotted line appears
at 1.0 where the two prices are equal. The mass of the plot above 1.0 are trips
which would have been more expensive to take with Uber than with taxi. For each
location Uber prices are estimated using the realized trip distance and time for
rides in the taxi trip records. The surge price profile uses averages calculated for
each weekday and hour, but from 2016. These estimated prices are compared to
total fares, including tip, from realized trips in the taxi trip records.
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Figure 1.7: Geographic Density Measure over NYC
Note: Divisions in the map are different taxi zones, the unit of analysis for most of the paper.
The boundary or the exclusion zone is denoted by a thick black line in northern Manhattan,
south of which green cabs cannot pick up passengers. Density is measured by the total
building area over the ground area in the particular zone. Checkered areas are excluded from
analysis in the spatial auto-regressive models in Appendix A.2.1. Source: NYC Planning
PLUTO
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Figure 1.8: Total Pickups by Taxi Zone, Q1 2016
Notes: Observations are organized by density measured as total building area over ground
area. Pickups are normalized to pickups per square mile in the zone to account for significant
variation in taxi zone size.
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Figure 1.9: Uber Share of Transit Market by Density, Q2 2016
Note: This is a log-log graph of share on density normalized between 0 and 1. Observations
are organized by density measured as total building area over ground area at the level of a
taxi zone. Share is measured as the share of pickups Uber made over all FHV, yellow taxi,
and green taxi trips in the same area for the second quarter of 2016. Point sizes reflect the
relative total volume of rides in the period of interest.
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Figure 1.10: Traffic Camera Locations
Note: Each blue dot is the location of a traffic camera from which I scraped images
in September and December 2015. In this version of the paper not all locations
were processed at all times because of manual constraints. Additionally, camera
locations in the outer boroughs tend to overlook highways rather than local streets.
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Figure 1.11: Sample of Traffic Camera Image Processing
Note: This image is a screenshot of the program developed to process the scraped
feeds from New York City traffic cameras. Taxi vacancy is determined by the taxi
light atop the cab; hence, processing is more prone to errors in daytime. The red
box surrounds the taxi in the image, but it is not part of the original program.
61
Figure 1.12: Zones Included in the Estimation
Note: Zones explicitly modeled in the demand analysis are shaded gray. Census
tracts are outlined in dimmed gray while taxi zones are separated by dark gray.
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Figure 1.13: Uber’s Share of Pickups Around the Exclusion Border, Q3 2014
Note: Shares are initially calculated by census tract; data from an earlier period
when Uber pickups are available by census tract is used for this figure only. Each
tract identified by its distance from the green exclusion border based on its centroid.
Shares in each bin are then weighted by the total pickups. Pick up assignment
issues at the border precisely likely yield this strange drop off in the bin right
before the exclusion zone. It is also possible green taxis are not heavily penalized
for infinitesimal infractions.
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Figure 1.14: Average Estimated Taxi Wait Time Elasticity by Area
Note: The map measures the average taxi wait time elasticity for consumers in-
cluded in the demand analysis using the variables’ values in June 2016.
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Figure 1.15: Estimated αl Parameters over Density
Note: Density is measured by the total building area over the ground area in
the particular zone. Here density has been normalized to be between 0 and 1, to
emphasize the relative difference across taxis zones. Each dot represents the fitted
αl for the location with that density.
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Figure 1.16: Compensating Variation per Uber Ride, 2013 to 2016
Note: The map illustrates the average change in consumer welfare (in $) per ride for
Uber riders in each of the zones of the map. This change in welfare was measured
by calculating the welfare of the rider in 2016 compared to her choice set in 2013,
taken as the period “before Uber.”
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Figure 1.17: Fitted Compensating Variation over Geographic Density
Note: The figure rearranges the data from Figure 1.16 along geographic density.
The underlying data were fitted using a 3rd-degree polynomial.
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Figure 1.18: Compensating Variation per Uber Ride, After Banning Uber
Note: The map illustrates the average change in consumer welfare (in $) per ride for
Uber riders in each of the zones of the map. This change in welfare was measured
by calculating the welfare of the rider in 2016 compared to her choice set after Uber
is eliminated from the market. Note, unlike with the first measurement using 2013




Table 1.1: Comparison of Taxi / Uber Platforms
Type In Operation Matching Supply Cap Entrance Fee Geo. Limited
Yellow – Hail Binding High No
Green Aug. 2013 Hail Not Binding Low Yes
Uber May 2011 Dispatch No Cap Lowest No
Notes: While Uber began operations in New York in May 2011, the scale of its
operations only began to close the gap with yellow taxis in late 2014.
Table 1.2: Data Summary: Transit Choice
Source Date Range Variables Observations
ACS 2008, 2015 Choice, Time of Departure (ToD) 5600
MTA Travel Survey 05/2008 - 11/2008 Choice, Demographics, ToD 10580
TLC Pickup Data 03/2016 - 06/2016 Choice, Choice Characteristics, ToD 7.5m
Notes: The observations for “ACS” are the number of markets for which shares are
generated. There are 8 half-hour time periods for 350 census tracts for two years.
In the estimation the tract shares are aggregated to taxi zones.
Table 1.3: Data Summary: Transit Characteristics
Wait Time Travel Time Price Walking Distance
Taxi Simulated Data Data 0
Uber Data Simulated Data, Simulated 0
Walking 0 Simulated 0 Simulated
Public Transit Simulated Simulated Simulated Simulated
Notes: For each choice and characteristic, I list whether it is read off data or
simulated when the choice is an observed choice. Assume whenever a choice is
counterfactual, its characteristics are simulated as described in the text. A “0”
denotes that field is always assumed negligible.
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Table 1.4: Demand Estimation Results
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
(baseline) α0 -0.0433 0.0015
(25K ≤ inc < 50K) α2 -0.0428 0.0014
(inc < 75K) α3 -0.0359 0.0015
(inc < 100K) α4 -0.0337 0.0019
(inc < 150K) α5 -0.0287 0.0023
(inc < 200K) α6 -0.0282 0.0034




Table 1.5: Demand Estimation Results















Notes: I currently omit the standard errors because the correct formulation requires
accounting for the impact of the first-round (and in the case of αdens, second-round)
estimates on the variance of variables estimated later. To calculate the standard
errors by bootstrap will be saved for the end of the research process.
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Table 1.7: Summary of Changes in Each Counterfactual, by Density Quartile
In Exclusion Zone Outside Exclusion Zone
CF Variable 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
C1 Welfare 0.52 0.52 0.45 0.38 0.94 0.81 0.85 0.79
C2 Welfare 0.65 0.67 0.60 0.57 0.90 0.70 0.74 0.70
Total Rides −44.8 −23.9 −7.34 0.53 −96.4 −79.2 −71.3 −52.5
C3 Welfare 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.51 0.46 0.48 0.41
Total Rides −20.2 −15.4 −2.1 6.30 −43.2 −30.1 −33.5 −20.5
C4 Welfare 0.64 0.68 0.60 0.62 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.11
C5 Welfare 0.30 0.28 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.07
Notes: Measures are simple, that is unweighted, averages of the average for each
zone over the course of a simulated day. Welfare is measured as the compensating
variation per ride for an Uber passenger. Changes in rides are reported in average
percent changes, again unweighted by initial pickups. All changes are relative to




Digitization: An Application to
Transit Markets
2.1 Introduction
Internet-based services once offered the promise of reducing discrimination in the market
through anonymity. In many ways that promise was overstated, as digitization of our
lives has given information brokers unprecedented access to consumer preferences.1
Nor has digitization eliminated incidences of direct social discrimination; Edelman et
al. (2017) and Ge et al. (2016) document racial discrimination on Airbnb and the ride-
sharing platforms Uber and Lyft, respectively.
The potential remains, however, for digitization to mitigate statistical discrimination
in market services. Waldfogel (2003) documents the existence of a type of “discrimi-
nation” in radio markets; preference groups that offer businesses lower expected profits
1 See Shiller (2014).
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tend to be underserved.2 Waldfogel (2017), on the other hand, illustrates how digiti-
zation can reduce these externalities by lowering the cost of entry for products targeting
previously underserved groups.
In this paper I look for that potential in the rapidly changing taxi market of New
York City. A corollary of the results from Chapter 1 is that consumers of less ge-
ographically dense markets in the city suffered from negative preference externalities
when only hail taxis serviced the city. Digitization, through Uber, mitigated these ex-
ternalities by lowering the cost of cabs to enter those markets. This paper explicitly
documents this argument through two key findings. First, the search behavior of hail
taxis, even controlling for the profitability of different search routes, highlights statisti-
cal discrimination against certain classes of consumers. Second, the arrival of Uber has
mitigated the negative externalities in the cab markets among these consumers. While
further work is needed to identify the specific mechanism, a reasonable hypothesis is
that Uber’s matching technology allows contracts to be made without imposing the cost
of undirected searching in previously avoided areas of the city.
Using a rich data set containing the universe of taxi cab transactions in New York
City, I estimate a reduced form model of taxi drivers’ search behavior throughout the
city. Because of the volume of data, I am able to approximate the profitability of the
decisions a taxi can make while searching for a consumer. I leverage these estimates to
demonstrate taxis are leaving money on the table by not searching in certain areas of
the city or serving certain demographics. Finally, using data on Uber pickup locations,
I estimate which groups have benefitted most, in terms of ridership, from the entrance
of Uber.
This paper ties into several active research areas. The recent availability of rich taxi
transaction data has led to a number of papers exploring taxi search behavior. The
seminal paper Camerer et al. (1997) reasons that taxi drivers are not profit maximizers
but rather have target wages they attempt to hit each day. Recently, this result has come
under scrutiny with Farber (2005) and Farber (2015) arguing that taxis do not have
reference-dependent search preferences. Farber (2008) and Crawford and Meng (2011)
attempt to reconcile the empirical findings of the earlier and more recent research. This
paper assumes that throughout the course of a shift taxi drivers maximize their utility
2 In the case of radio, the scale of the preference group matters.
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but not necessarily profitability. This assumption permits estimating the value to these
drivers of not traveling to certain areas of the city.
The literature on statistical discrimination of a nature similar to this context ex-
tends to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). Their research demonstrated discrimi-
nation against African American in the labor market, but that discrimination could
be mitigated by living in “good”, that is wealthy, neighborhoods. Other research has
focused on teasing apart “first-degree” discrimination from statistical discrimination.
List (2004) tests for both in the sports card trading market. Finally, Edelman et al.
(2017) and Ge et al. (2016) both uncover “first-degree” discrimination on new digital
platforms. Ge et al. (2016) finds that African American passengers tend to get dropped
by Uber and Lyft drivers more frequently than white passengers; they do, however, note
that the impact was far less than for traditional taxi companies. In contrast to their
work, I focus on statistical discrimination. While digitization may not reduce ingrained
prejudice, it does the have possibility to reduce “rational” discrimination against certain
groups.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the data and the generation of
key variables, such as taxi search choice, used in the estimation. Section 2.2.6 uses the
data to illustrate broad characteristics of search patterns in different areas of New York
City. Section 2.3 introduces the regression model to derive taxi drivers’ search prefer-
ences. Section 2.4 presents the results from the estimation and Section 2.5 integrates
Uber pickup data to determine which groups have benefitted most from the arrival of
Uber into the market. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data Sources and Construction
In this section I walk through the available data. I then define a taxi cab’s search choice
set along with its decision nodes. Finally, I explain the procedure for calculating the
variables under consideration by a taxi when it makes its search decision.
2.2.1 Data Sources
The primary data source is the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC)’s
dataset on the universe of yellow taxi trips. An observation in the dataset includes
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several pieces of information pertinent to the trip including pickup and drop off locations
by longitude and latitude; the pickup and drop off time; fees, broken down into taxes,
tolls, tips, and the actual fare; and the trip time and distance. Critically, and unlike in
Chapter 1, during the time period studied up to 2013 the data also include identifiers
for individual cabs. This additional information simplifies the process of determining
how taxis cruise in between a drop off and their next pick up.
Because this data set only provides the locations of pickups and drop offs, I supple-
ment the information with detailed NYC road data from the NYC Department of City
Planning LION Database. The database provides a complete mapping of roads and
other transportation features in NYC. It will serve many purposes, but the two most
important are information on the specific street segment, that is the road between two
intersections, of a pickup and the ability to approximate the route a taxi took between
a drop off and its next pickup. The process of approximating these routes and notes
about its accuracy are described in Appendix B.1.
Demographic and crime data are taken from the 5-year averages of the American
Community Survey and the NYC Police Department’s crime map. The former are
available by census block group, while the latter are available by intersection and ag-
gregated by census block group. Events that occur on the intersections on the corner of
multiple census block groups are distributed uniformly across the groups. These census
block groups form a partition over New York City and will be denoted by the collection
B = {Bl}Ll=1 where L is the total number of census block groups.
2.2.2 Data Generation
Before describing how I determine choice data, I first detail how I take advantage of the
ability to track cab drivers over the course of the day. I interpret the TLC trip records
as collections of shifts for yellow taxi drivers.3 The complete set of shifts S partition
the data and can be further assigned to their respective drivers S = {Si = {Sik}Nik=1}Ni=1
where N is the total number of cab drivers and Ni the number of his or her shifts in
the dataset. A single observation in the dataset is a specific ride r on one of these
shifts. For now I suppress the notation for the specific driver and shift and let Sr for
r ∈ {1, . . . , Rik} denote a specific ride observation given a driver and shift.
3 See the Appendix B.2 for how shift changes are specifically determined.
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Let X(Sr) denote the vector of data available for the particular ride on this shift,
including pickup time and drop off time tb and te, respectively, and pickup and drop
off coordinates lb and le, respectively. Data available only at aggregated levels, such as
demographic data by census block group, are linked to trips through pickup and drop
off locations. Hence, the mean population income associated with a ride’s pickup point
is the income of the census block group such that lb(S
r) ∈ Bl.
A critical portion of the analysis focuses on the driver’s behavior between two rides in
a shift. These “between-trip” periods are known as searching trips and are not explicitly
in the data set. I infer searching trips from the data of two consecutive rides, e.g. Sr
and Sr+1. The details of constructing a searching trip are explained in Appendix B.2.
Denote the set of searching rides as C. Cik are the searching rides for shift k of
driver i and can be further indexed by r ∈ {0, . . . , Rik} so Cik = {Crik}r. Technically,
there is a searching trip before the first ride and after the last ride, denoted above by
r = 0 and r = Rik, respectively. Because it is impossible from the dataset to determine
when these shifts begin or end in terms of time or location before the first pickup or
after the last drop off, the first searching trip considered for each shift is C1 between
S1 and S2 and the last is CRik−1 between SRik−1 and SRik .
Because searching trips are not observed, information about them must be gleaned
from preceding and subsequent rides. Consider a specific searching trip Cr with pre-
ceding ride Sr and subsequent ride Sr+1. Key data for this paper include where the
searching trip begins and ends and when it begins and ends. Naturally the searching trip





Similarly the searching trip begins when the previous ride ends so tb(C
r) = te(S
r).
2.2.3 Identifying Decision Nodes
With the data set up I proceed to explain what the choice of a taxi driver looks like.
Because taxi drivers are obligated to accept fare requests, they will not always make
decisions in between rides.4 To wit, a cab in midtown Manhattan on a weekday will
likely find a new fare waiting after the completion of a previous ride. Lest an estimation
of the model overstate the propensity of cab drivers to seek fares in high passenger-traffic
4 They are legally obligated to accept fare requests. Of course this is an assumption, since face-to-face
discrimination is still an issue for taxis. See Ge et al. (2016) and Glanville (2015).
76
areas, it is important to ensure that only non-trivial cruising trips are considered. The
following criteria are used to determine whether a cab driver is making a decision about
where to search in between rides:
1. An intersection is passed between on a searching trip
2. Over two minutes have passed between rides
If either condition is satisfied, I identify the driver as having made a non-trivial
decision. To motivate the first, consider that at an intersection a cab typically has up
to three potential options to take: straight, left, and right. I assume any movement at
an intersection is a conscious decision on the cab driver’s part and ignore the possibility
that high traffic precludes making turns if desired. It is possible, however, that a taxi
driver circles a block to end up in largely the same location or waits in place. Both are
obviously decisions on his or her part but are not explicitly visible in the data. Hence
I impose an arbitrary “decision threshold” after 2 minutes, after which it is determined
the cab chose to stay in the same location. Further details on the identification of
decision points are in Appendix B.3.
To illustrate the frequency of these decision points, I take data from the first six
months of 2012 and break down the percentage of cruising trips during which a taxi
driver is making a decision. Overall cab drivers cross at least one intersection between
92% of trips. As a check that this metric is negatively correlated with the expected
probability of finding a passenger in the same location, I break down the measure by
time of day and weekday in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1. Both figures illustrate that the
percentage of searching trips with decision points decreases during rush hour, when it
is more likely that a drop off and pickup would occur in the same location.
2.2.4 Taxi Choice Variable
Rather than linking each searching trip featuring a decision node with a complicated
sequence of turns at intersections, I summarize the decision a cab makes at these nodes
with a simple trajectory variable between its drop off and the subsequent pick up. In
Section 2.3 I discuss limitations on the usefulness of this descriptor.
I measure a searching trip’s trajectory as the true azimuth, or azimuth with respect
to the rotational North Pole, between the start and end point of the trip. The trajectory
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is further discretized based on which arc it passes through from the starting point.
Figure 2.2 depicts the directions radiating from a starting point as well as the cab’s
trajectory from the starting point at its last drop off to its next pick up. In this
example I identify the cab driver as choosing the 2nd direction. Cab drivers who stay in
the same location are labeled as choosing the 0th direction. Denote the direction taken
in a specific cruising trip of driver i on shift k as d(Crik).
2.2.5 Constructing Choice Characteristics
The final step is to link with each choice at a particular point in time and space a series
of characteristics. For this analysis I aggregate choices into states s by day of the week
wkd; hour group hr, which is six groups of four hours starting at midnight; and, census
block group Bl. Let C(s) be the set of searching trips beginning in this state.
I consider two types of outcomes for each of the searching trips in C(s). The first are
ride-specific, e.g. fare, trip distance, and demographic outcomes for the ride following
the searching trip, i.e./ where the taxi ends up in its next pickup X(Sr+1ik ) for C
r
ik in the
set. The second is the time between the beginning of the searching trip and the next
ride. For notational simplicity I assume this searching time is a characteristic included
in X(Sr+1ik ). In a slight abuse of notation, let X(C
r
ik) designate the collection of these
outcomes for the relevant searching trip.
I ultimately also consider the implications on the rest of the shift from a particular
searching trip. For example, I want to pick up how costly it would be for a driver to end
up dropping off in an outer borough. Let X(Crik; tr) be the outcomes from subsequent
rides beginning before tr hours after the beginning of the searching trip, i.e. for trips
Sr
′
ik such that r




ik) + tr. It is feasible that the cab driver may
have no pickups in the tr hours after beginning the searching trip. With this notation
I can finally describe the construction of the variables used for estimation.
For constructing choice variables I fix the parameter tr. For a given tr, construct-
ing X(Crik; tr) requires aggregating outcomes over all subsequent rides within the time
period. Depending on the variable, an appropriate aggregation might be summing or












ik) + tr} ∗ 1{tb(SRikik ) < tb(Crik) + tr}
The second condition added above requires that the last ride on the shift begins before
the end of the time period considered. If this condition is not added, then some observa-
tions near the end of shifts might have artificially low outcomes if tr encapsulates several
hours after the beginning of the cruising trip. Finally, given X(Crik; tr), I calculate the






ik; tr)1{Crik ∈ C(s)} ∗ 1{d(Crik) = j}∑
i,k,r 1{Crik ∈ C(s)} ∗ 1{d(Crik) = j}
Hence Xj(s) is really the expected outcome from choosing direction j.
2.2.6 General Patterns
Using these constructed variables, Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 illustrate the relative values
for cabs choosing to move north, which includes directions 8, 1, 2, and 3, versus those
that choose to move south. Figure 2.3 depicts the relative share averaged over all states.
Areas in the lightest colors (< 1) are those where cabs tend to move south. With the
exception of southeast NYC, cabs have a tendency to move south with varying degrees
of uniformity. Considering that most pickups in Manhattan are concentrated in the
central area south of Central Park, this result is rather unsurprising.
The other two figures serve as references for the estimation. Figure 2.4 maps the
relative median income for the next pick up of a taxi that chooses to search north versus
south. Figure 2.5 maps the same for race. Race is measure from 0 to 1, where unity
indicates the area has a completely African American community. The figure illustrates
that moving north nearly everywhere, though, with different degrees of intensity, in-
creases the probability of a pickup in an more African American neighborhood. Linking
the pictures from Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.5 provides some preliminary pattern that
could result in African American neighborhoods receiving worse taxi service. To control
for pecuniary search incentives, however, I turn to the choice model.
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2.3 Model and Estimation
2.3.1 Choice Model
I estimate a simple discrete choice logit model of the cab drivers’ decisions during
searching trips. As described in Section 2.2 I consider each cab driver making a simple
directional decision from their starting location at the start of the particular searching
trip.
To that end I estimate the following decision function
f(s, ε, ξ, β) = arg max
j∈C(s)
[u(s, j, β) + ξj(s) + εij ] (2.1)
where s, the state includes day of week, hour group, and census block group. C(s)
is the cab driver’s choice set and will depend only on the location component of the
state. The set C(s) and hence the co-domain of f are restricted to a finite set. In the
estimation the choice set consists of the four cardinal and four ordinal directions, and
the choice to stay in the same location. The choice set can further be constrained by
geographical restrictions imposed by starting locations, e.g. driving south from Battery
Park in southern Manhattan is not in its choice set.
An important point to highlight is that the directional choices from different starting
locations are the same in name only. The choice-specific unobservable ξj(s), for example,
is not constrained to be the same for the jth choice from different starting states. Hence
the unobservable is fit by hour group, census block group, day of week, and direction.
I make the standard assumption that εij are i.i.d. choice/driver-specific shock pa-
rameters following a type-1 extreme value distribution. In a model without cab-driver
specific information, these errors carry the entire weight of differentiating decision out-
comes in a given state. This assumption may not be innocuous in this application.
Unobservables may be correlated across choices because the simple model does not con-
trol for driver. Drivers could be more predisposed to particular neighborhoods closer to
their final drop off point or in which they have more familiarity.5
The payoff function u(s, j, β) is the key object of interest and is assumed to take on
5 There is some evidence of this behavior in Haggag et al. (2017).
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a linear form
u(s, j, β) = δj(s)
= Xj(s)β + ξj(s)
where Xj are choice-specific outcomes. I let choice 0, that is the taxi driver staying
in the same location, serve as the normalizing choice and denote it by j¯. Let X¯j(s) =
Xj(s)−Xj¯(s). The probability of a cab choosing a particular direction is then given by
the formula
P (j | s, β) = exp(X¯j(s)β + ξ¯j(s))
1 +
∑







The high volume of data for Manhattan and the discretization of the choice set allows
the choice probabilities to be empirically estimated using calculated shares, denoted
P dataj (s).
P dataj (s) =
∑
i,k,r 1{Crik ∈ C(s)} ∗ 1{d(Crik) = j}∑
i,k,r 1{Crik ∈ C(s)}
(2.2)
As shown by Berry (1994) I can reduce the estimation of β in the logit model to a
simple linear regression with the empirical shares.
log(P dataj (s))− log(P data0 (s)) = δ¯j(s) (2.3)
= X¯j(s)β + ξ¯j(s)
β is then backed out in the standard by treating ξ¯j as an error. This is the key regression
model in the analysis.6
6 In the regression the error is clustered by state.
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2.3.3 Cleaning Data for Estimation and Endogeneity
To identify the choice set by location I simply observe the number of searching trips
starting from state s that have a trajectory in direction j. If P dataj (s) = 0 (except
for j = 0) the direction is excluded from the choice set. Because data is aggregated
over such a long time horizon and over thousands of observations, this is the easiest
way to detect if a direction is geographically infeasible. Presumably if the direction
were geographically feasible at least one cab would choose that direction over the many
observations in the dataset.
Second I limit what searching trips I include in the estimation along two criteria.
First, only searching trips beginning from Manhattan are used in the estimation. Gen-
erally over 90% of trips in the dataset end in Manhattan. This exclusion is required
because of the high data requirements in the construction of the variables used in the es-
timation but simultaneously is not a significant issue since most yellow taxi cab activity
is in Manhattan.
The second condition limits the dataset to observations where the directional de-
cision of the cab from its starting point can be gleaned with some confidence. For
searching trips the only available locational data is the starting point lb(C
r) and ending
point le(C
r). Drawing a vector between the two and labeling that the directional choice




ik). For example, if one point starts at the 5th Avenue Apple
Store and ends at Rockefeller Center — roughly 10 blocks apart on 5th Avenue — this
analysis would contend the driver chose to search south. Given tb(C
r) and te(C
r), the
starting and ending times, I see the cab driver took one hour to complete the cruising
trip, however, so it is highly unlikely he or she went straight from the Apple Store to
Rockefeller center. He instead might have traveled north, and eventually turned around,
or traveled around Central Park. The initial directional decision of this cab driver was
actually to travel north, not south.
To address this issue I approximate the time and route taken by the cab drivers
taken from lb(C
r) and le(C
r). Details of this approximation are in Appendix B.1. If
the actual time and estimated time are within 5 minutes of each other, then the route is





The major concern for the validity of the specification is endogeneity issues that
might arise from ξ¯j being correlated with some components X¯j . One specific instance
might be, for example, including expected passenger income in the specification but
leaving out crime rates. Generally, the perceived profitability of a choice might be a
function of the number of cabs that make the same choice. The channel through which
that might occur is by affecting the probability a cab gets a ride after traveling in a
certain direction. By calculating the outcome of cruising trips with the time cutoff tr
instead of a fixed number of subsequent rides, this probability is directly taken into
account. For example, choosing direction 8 may always lead to a high fare, conditional
on the rare event of actually finding a passenger. Direction 4 may always lead to a
mediocre fare but finding a passenger is guaranteed. This expected outcome is reflected
in the calculation of Xj(s; tr); after a fixed period of time fewer cab drivers who chose
direction 4 will have actually found a fare and hence their assigned outcome X(Crik; tr)
would be 0.
2.4 Results
Table 2.2 reports the full collection of variables and their method of construction. In
this analysis I focus on variables looking forward 2 and 3 hours from the beginning of
the searching trip. Variables expressed as percentages, such as race composition, or
which do not “accumulate” are aggregated by averaging, whereas fares, waiting times,
etc. are aggregated by summation. Previous work established the sensitivity of results
to different measures of tr, that is how far past a searching time cab drivers consider
7 As might be expected the longer the distance between the starting and ending point of the cruising
trip, the more inaccurate the estimated time is. This problem can be dealt with in two ways. First,
instead of using a 5 minute error threshold, instead use a threshold that scales with the crow’s distance
length of the trip. Second, if dropping these observations does not introduce a selection bias, then there
is no problem; there is enough data that identifying a single set of “taste” parameters is still feasible
with the remaining data. A problem exists if the share of cabs choosing each direction is significantly
impacted. While this robustness analysis is not included, it can be by checking the relative size of
dropped observations for each state.
83
outcomes when making a choice.8 To give a sense of the economic significance of mag-
nitudes that will be reported with the regression results, Table 2.3 reports descriptive
statistics for the RHS variables used in the regressions.
The basic model regresses the share of each directional choice on various character-
istics of searching trips along that direction for each state. In the different specifications
I compare models with and without demographic characteristics and assess fit via like-
lihood ratio tests. For these regressions I also compare results just using variables
accumulated by averaging to avoid consideration of the time horizon over which the cab
drivers think about outcomes.
The results suggest that cultural factors have bite in directional decisions. There are
also a few curiosities as well as results that help intuitively validate the results observed.
First, signs are largely robust across different tr, which is particularly important for the
averaged variables which are less likely to change significantly with larger tr. Finally,
Table 2.5 reports the average change in a direction’s share from a one standard deviation
increase in each of the eight variables using β from specifications (3) and (6). The output
suggests that the most significant economic factor in determining cab’s directional choice
is, as expected, expected fare.
The critical result for the paper, however, are the terms on demographics. Even con-
trolling for monetary incentives, I find that taxis have a tendency to search in wealthier
and whiter neighborhoods. Depending on the robustness of the model, this provides
evidence of some externality of living in less wealthy neighborhoods or neighborhoods
with more African Americans. In the discussion to follow I then test what communities
have most benefitted from the introduction of Uber to the market.
The rest of the section discusses peculiarities of the choice model results. Among
the results robust across tr, there are also three unexpected results. First, crime is
somehow an attractive property. There are two potential explanations. First, only the
location of significant crimes, as listed in Table 2.2, are known and included as part of
the crime rate, which Table 2.3 shows, is quite low overall. Cab drivers might be less
worried about murder and grand larceny than a passenger not paying.9 Nonetheless,
8 Those results suggested drivers are not myopic and initially motivated modeling the dynamic
decisions of taxi drivers in Chapter 1.
9 Unfortunately, an unpaid fare does not show up in the dataset.
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the effect is significant, nontrivial in magnitude, and positive in all included specifi-
cations. The more logical alternative then is that crime rate is correlated with some
other attractive property dropped from the specification. One explanation is that crime
rates are higher in commercial areas, which may attract cab drivers because of the high
transient population throughout the day. This explanation also serves to deal with the
second curiosity that areas where residents claim to take cabs to work are less desirable.
Future work may permit coefficient values to changes with time of day.
Finally, fare / time is significantly negative after accounting for fare. This result
may again reflect neglecting commercial areas, where fares are high. Commercial areas
have generally slower traffic in Manhattan and hence lower fare / time ratios might
appear more attractive to cab drivers simply because they have higher expected fares.
Indeed both fare / time is positive and significant before accounting for fare.
2.5 Discussion
Given that I have established that taxi drivers are avoiding some demographics in their
search behavior, I tie this back to Uber by finding what communities have most benefit-
ted, in terms of total rides, since the entrance of Uber. For this exercise I use information
on Uber pickups from the TLC. Because the TLC only provides pickup information by
taxi zone, which are partitioned by census blocks, I aggregate all data to the taxi zone
level. I then run a simple accounting regression of the total Uber rides per unit area and
population on the same characteristics featured in Section 2.4. To control for financial
incentives, I use estimates of fares earned from taxis picking up in that zone.
The results of this regression are reported in Table 2.6. In the first specification I
regress the total change in rides on the three characteristics. I find that median income
is the only significant factor, and in the direction further favoring communities already
served well by taxis. Oddly, historic fares are completely irrelevant. This difference
might be because the driver does not choose specific pickup locations but is instead
directed by the app.
The second specification regresses the total change in pickups from 2016 to 2013,
during which time most growth was driven by Uber as established in Chapter 1. In
this case the results are more interesting. I find that lower income and more African
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American communities were the beneficiaries of new areas serviced by Uber. This is
the finding that serves as motivation to further investigate the potential role for Uber
in mitigating preference externalities with the old technology.
2.6 Conclusion
This essay has demonstrated the potential importance of non-pecuniary factors in the
search decisions of taxis. I leverage these results to demonstrate cabs have abandoned
some value by not picking up in certain neighborhoods. From the consumer perspective
I interpret these results as the cost of perceived preference externalities or statistical
discrimination. I concluded with a simple analysis assessing the characteristics of neigh-
borhoods that have benefitted most from the arrival of Uber into the market. The results
suggest the potential for digitization to help mitigate the costs of these externalities.
Further work is needed, however, to isolate the mechanism allowing Uber to serve
these neighborhoods better. Chapter 1 of this dissertation would suggest Uber’s match-
ing technology enables Uber to pick up in previously underserved neighborhoods at
lower cost. Alternatively, other channels might be at play. Taxi drivers might worry
about searching in certain neighborhoods because of concerns about payment guaran-
tees, the length of time before minding a match, etc. Different aspects of Uber’s dispatch
system address these concerns. Credit cards mitigate the worry about a passenger stiff-
ing a driver, while the dispatch system itself hedges against searching in low-demand
neighborhoods.10
One avenue to directly test this hypothesis is by taking advantage of growth in e-
hailing in New York City. With the appropriate data one could compare the e-hailing
system to Uber and Lyft’s dispatching programs to tease out the marginal impact of
these proposed features in reducing perceived preference externalities.
10 Though, Uber drivers still have concern about lengthy idle times by being matched to consumers
far from their location.
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2.7 Tables and Figures








Source: NYC TLC using average weekday data from January to June 2016. Each
hour group corresponds to a four hour period starting at midnight.
Figure 2.1: Percentage of Searching Trips with Intersection Crossing by Hour
Source: NYC TLC using average weekday data from January to June 2016.
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Notes: The figure summarizes the information for a taxi’s searching trip. The
origin is the location of the drop off, and the trajectory points in the direction of
the driver’s subsequent pickup. In the discretization of this decision, the decision
the driver has made falls into one of X number of discrete categories (here 9) based
on the arc the trajectory crosses (here 2).
Table 2.2: Variables and Aggregation Methods
Short Name Description Aggregation Source
fare{tr} Total fare less taxes Sum TLC
wait{tr} Search time (seconds) between rides Sum TLC
time{tr} Time (seconds) elapsed on rides Sum TLC
frdist{tr} Fare / distance traveled on rides Mean TLC
frtime{tr} Fare / time elapsed on rides Mean TLC
race{tr} Percent African American Mean ACS
inc{tr} Mean income (1000s USD) Mean ACS
taxi{tr} Percent using taxis for morning transit Mean ACS
crime{tr} Annual crime rate per milliona Mean NYPD
a Crimes include assault, larceny, robbery, burglary, and murder.
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Figure 2.3: Relative Choice of Taxis to Move North versus South, by Zone
Notes: The share of taxis moving in directions 8, 1, 2, 3 were aggregated by taxi
zone and divided by the share of taxis moving in directions 7, 6, 5, 4.
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Figure 2.4: Relative Median Income of Pickups After Moving North
Notes: The share of taxis moving in directions 8, 1, 2, 3 were aggregated by taxi
zone and divided by the share of taxis moving in directions 7, 6, 5, 4.
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Figure 2.5: Relative Race Index of Pickups After Moving North
Notes: The share of taxis moving in directions 8, 1, 2, 3 were aggregated by taxi
zone and divided by the share of taxis moving in directions 7, 6, 5, 4. The underlying
measure of race is between 0 and 1, with 1 signifying a completely African American
neighborhood.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables, tr = 1
Observations Mean Median Std. Deviation
Total Fares 119543 28.89 30.93 7.26
Total Delay 119543 2032.57 1992.83 957.39
Fare / Distance 119534 4.666 4.6003 7.8910
Fare / Time 119538 0.0153 0.0143 0.0313
Percent African American 119286 0.0556 0.0462 0.0396
Mean Income (thousands USD) 119513 85.3308 90.9410 23.5723
Taxi Usage 118986 0.0259 0.0254 0.0114
Crime Rate 119504 0.6895 0.3413 1.2211
Notes: Total Fares and Total Delay are calculated by summing from the start of
the searching ride over the next hour. The rest of the variables are averaged for
that time period. Averages by state are calculated for the first half of 2012.
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Table 2.4: Estimating Economic Versus Social Factors
Over the Next 2 Hours (tr = 2) Over the Next 3 Hours (tr = 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fare / 0.0182** 0.0093* -0.0025 0.0191 0.0034 -0.0026
Distance (0.0078) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0124) (0.0030) (0.0016)
Fare / 1.9226** 0.7537 -1.5290*** 2.8317*** 0.2975 -1.2999***
Time (0.9776) (0.6344) (0.3915) (0.9414) (0.3482) (0.3163)
Race 1.3441*** -2.0091*** 6.6901*** -1.2809***
(0.3350) (0.3192) (0.4669) (0.4597)
Income 0.0386*** 0.0233*** 0.0573*** 0.0234***
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0013)
Taxi Usage -13.0538*** -8.5087*** -15.8888*** -7.0804***
(1.3960) (1.3086) (2.0096) (1.8105)
Crime 0.0646*** 0.0517*** 0.0775*** 0.0517***
(per 1000s) (0.0078) (0.0073) (0.0118) (0.0107)
Fare 0.1963*** 0.1331***
(0.0056) (0.0032)
Search Time -0.000021** 0.000092***
(0.000010) (0.000026)
Observations 98360 98360 98360 97030 97030 97030
Adj R2 0.0021 0.0849 0.1715 0.0053 0.2358 0.3197
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Notes: Time and distance are not included here because they are redundant with
both fare and fare/time and fare/distance included. Observations are at the state
level. Regressors in specifications (1), (2), and (3) are accumulated over two hours
from the state and direction according to the method in Table 2.2. Regressors in
(4), (5), and (6) are accumulated over three hours.
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Table 2.5: Percent Change in Share from One Standard Deviation in Variable
Percent Change
in Share
Fare / Distance -0.0724 %
Fare / Time -0.1659 %
Percent African American -2.2692 %
Mean Income 1.8916 %
Taxi Usage -0.05092 %
Crime Rate 0.5700 %
Total Fares 30.0160 %
Search Time -0.1726 %
Notes: For each state and direction I change the value of the relevant variable by
one standard deviation from the population distribution and calculate the change
in share. I then average over all states for the covered area.
Table 2.6: Areas Benefitting from Ride Growth, June 2013 to June 2016
Total Rides: Uber Total Change






Pop & Area Control YES YES
Observations 63 63
Adj R2 0.48 0.34
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Notes: Regressors are averaged from census block groups to taxi zones by popula-
tion weights. The dependent variables are calculated per unit of area in the zone.
Race is an index from 0 to 1 with 1 representing an entirely African American
community. Fare is the expected fare for a pickup based on historic taxi pickup
data.
Chapter 3
Heterogeneous Effects of Subsidy
and Infrastructure Investment in
Electric Vehicles Adoption
3.1 Introduction
In the wake of mounting attention toward investment in energy efficiency and renewable
resources, the US allocated approximately $400 million of the 2009 American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) toward investment and research into electric vehicles
and the deployment of a charging station infrastructure. The federal and California
state governments concurrently rolled out other incentive programs to encourage the
adoption of electric cars, including hefty rebates, tax credits, and electricity discounts.
Since the initial enthusiasm, however, concerns have grown about the implications for
inequality from these subsidies, primarily taken up the wealthy.1 The dual concerns
of inequality and environmentalism led to more targeted subsidy policies that have
exposed the heterogeneous efficacy of freely allocated charging stations and flat vehicle
subsidies in promoting EV adoption. In this paper we identify important sources of
this heterogeneity and develop a model to assess the value, or cost, of this new wave of
policies.
1 See West (2004) and Borenstein and Davis (2016).
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Using a new dataset featuring household-level vehicle purchase data with detailed
geographic and timing information on the deployment of charging stations, we estimate
a rich discrete choice model of demand for the automobile market in California. The
dataset permits identification of consumer heterogeneity impossible in the existing lit-
erature. We characterize 1) marginal consumers with respect to the EV subsidy along
demography-based differences, such as income and factors that correlate with attitudes
toward environmental issues and 2) the marginal impact of charging stations along
geography-based differences, including employment concentration and the average com-
muting distance of locals. The key to this empirical analysis is the identification and
estimation of price elasticities across these demographic groups and the marginal benefit
of non-residential charging stations on EV demand across the different geographies.
We use these dimensions to account for heterogeneity for two reasons. If consumers
are heterogeneous in price elasticities, distributing EV subsidies flatly across income
groups could generate less EV demand than a tiered subsidy structure. It is not straight-
forward, however, whether a regressive or progress subsidy would create more EV de-
mand per dollar subsidy. This finding would identify the low-income group as marginal
consumers. On the other hand, if consumers consider EVs luxury goods, EVs may
face high elasticities for high-income groups. Depending on these competing forces, the
same subsidy amount may lead to a greater (lesser) substitution to EVs for gas vehicles
among low-income buyers than among high-income, ceteris paribus.
The nature of the current charging technology directs us to characterize the marginal
impact of a station by its locations employment concentration and the commuting dis-
tance of its locals. Because of the lengthy charge time drivers may most benefit from
charging in areas not time costly, that is a place where one would stay regardless of
intent to charge the vehicle. Workplaces, much more than other public locations fre-
quented by travelers, satisfy this criterion. These pieces of evidence hint that stations
at a location with a large concentration of employees, such as a commercial city center,
would have higher benefit to EV drivers, and therefore, higher marginal impact on EV
demand.
We use California to estimate a flexible model of vehicle demand as the state offers
several advantages. First, California has the largest market for EVs in the United States.
Second, it features rich geographic differences across the state. Additionally, regional
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entities, from counties and cities to utility districts, have implemented several of their
own incentive programs on top of those available federally and from the state. The
exogenous variation in resources across regions and over time help identify the different
price elasticities and marginal impact of stations across the target dimensions. Not only
do these features assist with our identification but also make for an interesting testing
ground for alternative funding schemes that would redirect state funds to specific areas.
Moreover, the electricity grid in California guarantees that substituting gas vehicles for
EVs strictly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, thereby making the maximization of EV
adoption a reasonable policy goal for the environmental social planner.
Besides the growing literature on the value of green subsidy programs and the trade-
off between this class of subsidies and inequality, a central issue are indirect network
effects with respect to the relationship of charging station deployment and electric ve-
hicles. Most recent indirect network literature has emphasized competing platform
markets benefiting from the growth of a platform-specific complementary market. Nair
et al. (2004), Clements and Ohashi (2005), Dube´ et al. (2010), Goolsbee and Klenow
(2002), Gandal et al. (2000) analyzed the impact of an indirect network effect from soft-
ware markets in varying tech industries. This line of research differs from our current
project in several ways. First, except for Goolsbee and Klenow (2002), these papers
have featured non-compatible platforms competing for market concentration. In this
market, with a few exceptions, charging stations have been standardized to work across
all PEVs.2 Our ultimate question of interest is in the growth of the relatively new
electric vehicle market space, rather than competition among firms in a mature market.
In this respect our setting is similar to Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) which analyzes the
diffusion of home computers in the 1990s, where the network size and specific tools,
like e-mail, drive adoption more than platform-specific software. Additionally, we may
consider the role of a similar peer effect in our setting using the methodology proposed
by Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) in which the adoption of solar panels is encouraged
by neighbors’ adoption.
Two recent papers cover the same market with particular attention toward the angle
of the indirect network effect. Li (2017) follows in the tradition of papers highlighting
2 A notable exception might be Tesla’s expanding supercharger network. These chargers are meant
for long-distance trips, however, rather than everyday use.
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the potential costs and benefits of platform competition. She focuses on the higher
end of the charging station market, in which different car companies have an incentive
to build car-specific fast charging stations. Our work focuses on the larger, lower end
segment of the charging market which does not face these compatibility issues. Springel
(2017) studies the effectiveness of charging station build out and vehicle subsidies in
the Norwegian market, using county as a geographic market. She finds that while
charging station investment is initially effective, there are high diminishing marginal
returns. This paper answers a similar question, but incorporates, what we show, are
important dimensions of heterogeneity in estimating the value of charging stations, using
more granular geographic areas for market definitions. We suggest that by defining a
geographic area larger than the effective area the estimated benefit of charging stations
will be biased. Section 3.3 will demonstrate how sensitive demand models are to the
geography considered for charging stations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe specific obstacles for
widespread adoption of PEVs and features of consumers and incentives in California.
Section 3.3 offers reduced formed evidence of key heterogeneity in the value of charging
stations by location and along consumer demographics. Section 3.5 presents the model
of consumer demand and Section 3.4 the data used to estimate the model. Section 3.6
presents the moments we use in a GMM estimation procedure to derive the parameters
of the demand model. We outline how features in our data sets allow the estimation
procedure to identify the parameters of demand in Section 3.7. We conclude with plans
for the future of this paper.
3.2 The Market for Electric Vehicles in CA
Many peculiarities of both electric vehicles and California differentiate its market for
electric and gasoline-fueled vehicles and make the region ripe for a focus of this study.
We identify two critical issues with the uptake of electric vehicles — their high price and
range anxiety — and link these two to the incentive instruments used by governments.
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3.2.1 Range Anxiety
Range anxiety when driving an electric vehicle stems from both their relatively short
range and the lack of charging stations. Here it is worth distinguishing between the
two types of electric vehicles. Plug-in electric vehicles (PEV) rely solely on a battery.
A second class of vehicles plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) have both a small
battery and standard gasoline tank. Range anxiety is more relevant for drivers of the
first class of vehicle.
As shown in Table 3.1, the full electric range of PEVs is on average only 30% of
the range of gas vehicles. The Nissan LEAF carries a 84-mile range whereas the Chevy
Volt has nearly a 400-mile range. The Tesla Model S is one of few fully electric vehicle
with comparable range to traditional gasoline vehicles. According to the Center for
Sustainable Energy (2013a), nearly 40% of survey respondents were not satisfied with
the electric range of their purchased vehicle (see Table 3.3).
The lengthy time to charge these vehicles poses an additional problem for the in-
frastructure. According to charging station usage statistics of PEV owners by the EV
Project (2014), owners leave their car charging for 6.2 to 7.4 hours on private away-
from-home Level 2 chargers and 3.5 to 4.9 hours on public away-from-home Level 2
chargers.3 If a PEV driver is looking for a public charging station as a solution for a
drained battery, the low turnover at these stations decrease the likelihood of finding an
open charger.
Because every standard electricity outlet is effectively a charging station, albeit
slow, for an electric vehicle, the importance of a charging station network may not
be immediate despite some evidence on the pervasiveness of range anxiety. Further
evidence that suggests charging stations should have little impact on demand comes
from CA driver habits. The LEHD LODES dataset shows the average Californian
drives approximately 26 miles, well within the single-charge range of the Nissan LEAF
or Tesla Model S. Table 3.6 indicates that the drive range for LEAF owners is even
shorter (24.8 miles) per day. These figures suggest that charging away from home may
be unnecessary for most use cases.
3 See Table 3.2 for a comparison of the speed standards. Because compared to Level 2 chargers
Level 1 chargers are impractical charging solutions for modern electric vehicles, we do not consider them
as part of the charging station network in our analysis.
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Other evidence, however, reveals these shorter driving ranges may be a symptom of
range anxiety. Table 3.6 shows that Volt, which has the range of a standard gasoline
vehicle, owners tend to use their vehicles lengthier trips. In addition, despite the short
trips PEV owners tend to take every opportunity to charge their vehicles. 27% of
charging events were away from home for the LEAF while only 16% were for the Volt in
Q4 2013 according to EV Project (2014). Additionally, the survey Center for Sustainable
Energy (2013a) noted the importance of having work-place chargers in their decision to
purchase their electric vehicle (see Figure 3.3).
More direct evidence of range anxiety comes from the different charging behavior
between full electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Figure 3.4 reports how
much of the battery remains when a charging event takes place, taken from a sample of
participants in an EV Project field study (EV Project (2014)). For the range-impaired
Nissan LEAF, charging events take place the most when the battery still is 50% full or
more. LEAF drivers charge even though the battery is not close to empty. In contrast,
the Chevy Volt is charged primarily when the battery is fully exhausted. It reveals that
LEAF drivers make a concerted effort to keep the battery at least half full all the time
while Volt drivers let them run out. If range were not a concern for LEAF drivers, we
should expect to see similar charging event distribution of Volt.
According to the Center for Sustainable Energy (2013a), 71% of the PEV purchasers
were reportedly unsatisfied with the public charging infrastructure (see Figure 3.1).
Since then, however, the number of charging stations has exploded from 3,000 to over
10,000. Table 3.4 summarizes the number of charging stations over time. This growth
has coincided both with a growth in the number of electric vehicles in California and an
expansion of the subsidies available for these public stations in California. Early efforts
from the EV Project and ChargePoint America installed nearly 2000 charging stations in
the years leading to 2013. Table 3.5 has details about the projects. Since then California
and local governments have begun offering subsidies for charging stations. Figure 3.2
maps the subsidies available for public charging stations as of December 2016.
To facilitate the expansion of the charging network infrastructure, local governments
have afforded several rounds of subsidies. In addition to the nearly 2000 charging
stations installed in California by ChargePoint America and the EV Project since 2010,
over 2500 chargers have been added to the network. They account for 43% of the total
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charging stations in California as of December 2013. Representatives of the Department
of Energy have suggested many businesses and workplaces have begun installing stations
as a convenience to customers or employees.
3.2.2 High Price
While the market has changed significantly in the past half decade, electric vehicles still
tend to have higher upfront prices than gas vehicles. In 2013 the most popular fully
electric vehicle, the Nissan LEAF, had a $28,800 baseline price tag in 2013. In contrast
the Honda Civic, the most popular vehicle, cost only $16,555. The most expensive
electric vehicle, the Tesla Model S, which cost at least $69,900 at the time, while the
most expensive gas vehicle among the top 80 CA car models in 2013 cost $52,800.
While PEVs have higher upfront costs, they tend to have lower maintenance and fuel
costs than gas vehicles. Without discounting future costs or accounting for changes in
the price of oil, the maintenance and fuel costs are about $33,728 for gas vehicle, $20,460
for plug-in hybrid electric vehicle, and $19,344 for full electric vehicles purchased in
2013.4 Under the assumptions that generate those estimates, the PEV is still overall
more expensive than gas vehicles overall.
Both California, via the Clean Vehicle Rebate Program, and the federal government
offer tax credits for the purchase of PEVs. The federal government offers up to a $7500
for fully electric vehicles, while California offers up to $2500. Some districts in California
offer rebates on top of these two programs. Table 3.7 provides further details on rebate
amounts for specific models from federal and state sources. Figure 3.5 illustrates the
heterogeneity of local vehicle subsidies across California for a person with a $60,000
income, with the San Joaquin Valley offering the most generous.
Table 3.8 illustrates the practical effect of these cost differences even after account-
ing for the subsidies. Purchasers of electric vehicles are from a different part of the
income distribution than purchases of gas vehicles. For policy makers concerned with
4 The estimates assume 12,400 annual mileage and a 16-year lifespan. Fuel costs for the gas vehicle
are calculated based on 26.7 miles per gallon and a gas price of $3.5 per gallon. The fuel cost for PEV
is calculated by assuming $0.13 per kWh, taken from the average CA price as of January 2012, and a
mileage of 4.42 miles per kWh. The maintenance and repair costs include battery replacement, engine oil
change, tire rotation, etc. The assumptions are taken from Alternative Fuel Life-Cycle Environmental
and Economic Transportation (AFLEET) 2013. Numerous data sources include AFDC Price Report,
AEO Report, Argonne National Laboratory, and so on. See the User Guide for AFLEET Tool 2013.
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the potential for exacerbating inequality issues, these patterns show that subsidy money
is primarily funneled to the top of the income distribution. In response, California al-
tered its subsidy system to a regressive system with the largest subsidies available to
the lowest income individuals. These income eligibility requirements came into force on
March 29, 2016. By November 1, 2016, single households with incomes over 150,000
were ineligible for any subsidy. Table 3.8 shows that this change would have impacted
over 50% of historic EV purchases.
Other Incentives
The benefits from the programs described above are included in our analysis. There
are some other incentives we do not explicitly model in the paper. For example, limited
numbers of PHEVs and fully electric vehicles can gain access to HOV lanes on California
highways.5
3.3 Electric Vehicle Purchase Patterns
Before laying out the structural model of the paper, we first illustrate some important
features about consumers in the market for EVs we have claimed the previous literature
has missed. The first is how responsive different income groups are to subsidies on
electric vehicles. The second is the effective coverage area of a charging station. That
is, unlike a gas station which requires a few minutes to fill up, the specific location of
a charging station may be highly important to consumers as charging requires several
hours.
Using zip code-quarterly-car model-level data from IHS, we regress a count of each
electric vehicle model’s purchases in a given zip code on characteristics and median
demographics, including distance to work and income bracket, for the zip code. A full
description of the source for these variables is in Section 3.4. Each specification counts
charging stations in a home and associated work zip codes within varying radii of the
zip codes’ centroids. See Appendix C.1 for a full description of their construction.
5 In fact according the Center for Sustainable Energy (2013a) survey of PEV users, 59% claimed
HOV access was an “important” consideration in their purchase decision. Sheldon and DeShazo (2017)
claims that up to a quarter of registrations in California from 2010 to 2013 could be attributed to this
HOV policy.
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We report the results of the Poisson regression in Table 3.9. The reported coef-
ficients are the exponent of the coefficient from the Poisson model. Each coefficient
can be interpreted as the relative responsiveness from changes in that variable relative
to a baseline. For example, a coefficient of 1.786 on 2nd income quantile means that
compared to the lowest income quantile, this group is 78% (1.786-1) more likely to pur-
chase an EV. Hence, coefficients less than 1 imply a negative impact of that variable on
purchases.
First, we find that results are highly sensitive to the radius used to calculate relevant
charging stations and to the location of those charging stations. As we tighten the radius
for the calculation, for example, we find that the relationship of home chargers and
purchases increases in magnitude but decreases in significance. Work stations meanwhile
exhibit the opposite trend. Depending on the selection of this radius, one can overstate
the importance of home area chargers and simultaneously miss the relative importance
of work-area charging stations.
Second, we find what appears to be the standard result for the income dimension. In
the interaction of the income quantiles with price net subsidies, we find higher income
zip codes are less responsive to price than lower income are. Simultaneously, from the
income quantile terms we see that the “taste” for EVs also grows with income group.
To check how the two forces interact, we simulate a new $1000 subsidy on all electric
vehicles. We find, according to this simple model, the subsidy would yield 0.04 additional
electric vehicles per thousand in the upper quantile and only 0.008 new purchases in
the lowest quantile. Compared to the initial distribution of vehicles this represents an
increase in 40% for the lowest group but only 18% for the highest income group. For
the social planner that cares principally about introducing more EVs to the market,
these results suggest the money should be directed toward the highest quantile.
3.4 Data
We draw vehicle purchase data from a number of sources. The primary data source is
IHS, which provided us with monthly registration data by car model and fuel type across
all California zip codes. This is the dataset used in the generation of the descriptive
results of Table 3.9. In total the data cover 1314 unique zip codes from the years 2014
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to 2016.
For each vehicle we collect the MSRP of the base model as the base price and var-
ious standard characteristics from AutoTrader.com and Edmunds. The characteristics
included in the estimation are horsepower-weight, length-width ratio, drive type dummy
(2 or 4 wheel base), miles per dollar, driving range, and fuel type. The numerous in-
centive programs for electric vehicles described in section 3.2 require adjustments to
the baseline specifications for these vehicles. In particular, we consider electric vehicles
characteristics taking into account 1) the federal and state rebate, 2) the cost of in-
stalling a charging station for their home, and 3) miles per dollar using home charging
prices at the cheapest price under their energy provider.6 We get these rates from
the dominant energy provider in the county.
Charging station data is collected from the Alternative Fuels Data Center (AFDC),
which in turn collects from major charging station operators Blink, SemaCharge, and
Chargepoint, and Open Charge Map (OCM). These data sets provide longitude and
latitude coordinates thus allowing great flexibility in how we spatially aggregate the
data for use in the model. Data on charging station opening dates are provided in
older snapshots (before 2014) of the datasets. More recent snapshots do not include
opening dates and deduced by assuming stations that appear between snapshots, which
we collect twice a week.7
Central to identifying heterogenous consumers responses to incentive programs is
capturing critical demographics, including income, travel habits, etc. Our first source
is survey data from the California Air Resources Board Clean Vehicle Rebate Project
(CVRP). Each record in the dataset includes the county of the purchaser, the vehicle
make, which typically yields the vehicle model, and the date of purchase. The survey
additionally includes a wealth of demographics, including self-reported income brackets.
We also utilize the 2010 to 2012 California Department of Transportation CA Household
6 It might be unreasonable to assume the consumer always charges at the cheapest rate at home, but
this method also accounts for the possibility that a lot of charging is actually free from work chargers.
We assume consumers install Level 2 chargers at home based on the Center for Sustainable Energy
(2013a) survey of CVRP benefactors that found approximately 90% of respondents own a Level 2 home
charger for their PEV.
7 Operators provide the AFDC with opening dates of new stations, but OCM also relies on “com-
munity submissions” which might be less reliable than the information provided by operators. One may
also worry OCM stations are consistently reported “late” after there is enough of an electric vehicle
community in the area to report the station.
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Travel Survey (CHTS).8 In total the 2012 to 2013 survey covered 42,431 households.9
We use both sets of data to construct aggregated statistics on the income of new vehicle
and electric vehicle purchasers. To simulate income data for the model we use American
Community Survey (ACS) data on income distributions by census block group.
To control for the travel habits of consumers, we utilize the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics Origin-Destination Employee Statistics (LODES). The dataset,
of which we use the 2014 version, lists by home-work census block pairs the number
of employees. We use this information to generate information on employee driving
distances, since range anxiety is likely exacerbated for those with longer commutes, and
to generate counts of charging stations at work locations. The latter point is discussed
further in Appendix C.1.
Finally, we control for how environmental concern may increase willingness to pay
for clean vehicles. A growing literature documents the role of political preferences in
“green consumption.” Costa and Kahn (2013) found liberal communities are more
likely to participate in “voluntary restraint”, that is consume less electricity than more
conservative but otherwise identical households.10
Therefore, we follow Sexton and Sexton (2014) and others in using political pref-
erences to proxy for concern about the environment. Table 3.11 and Figure 3.6 both
provide descriptive evidence regarding how political preferences and income might af-
fect PEV purchases. The second and third columns in Table 3.11 show that more PEVs
are sold in high income counties compared to relatively low income counties. However,
income is not the only factor explaining the PEV purchase behavior. The fourth col-
umn reveals that San Francisco, Marin, and Sacramento counties prefer LEAF over
Volt while Orange and Riverside prefer Volt over LEAF. A critical difference in the
makeup of these counties are political preferences. The former counties tend to have
more Democrats than Republicans whereas the latter counties have more Republicans
than Democrats. This is shown in Figure 3.6. The left panel of contains two wealthy
counties (San Francisco and Marin and Orange) but with different average political ten-
dencies. The right panel has two less wealthy counties (Sacramento and Riverside) also
8 See Table 3.10 in Appendix 3.9 for survey size details.
9 Despite the name of the survey, households were surveyed from 2012 to early 2013.
10 See also Kahn (2007).
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with different political preferences. The statistics suggest that income affects the ex-
ternal margin of the PEV purchase decision while political preference may affect which
PEV to purchase.
For our estimation consumers are split into three groups — Republicans, indepen-
dents, and Democrats — with the latter presumably the most concerned about envi-
ronmental issues. We use data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to develop
a distribution of political tastes by zip code. The FEC data provide information on all
political contributions over $250. Records are also sufficiently detailed to match most
contributions with a recipient political party.
3.5 Demand Specification
In the static model consumers make choices in a specific market m defined by a time
q and location g. Our estimation will ultimately consider each zip code-quarter pair in
California a specific market.11 Let q(m) denote the quarter of market m, and g(m)
denote the zip code of market m. Each consumer has several relevant characteristics:
income yi, political affiliation polii, and commuting distance di. Additionally, at a
specific time, the consumer may take advantage of public or private home and work








i ). Specific details on
how we model which charging stations are relevant to consumers are in Appendix C.1.
Consumer i in market m purchases one product from the choice set Jm or an outside
good to maximize her utility. While all product characteristics of a vehicle are fixed
within a year, the price subsidy available may differ both across quarter and location.
When purchasing a vehicle j ∈ Jm the utility of consumer i in market m has the
following form:
uij =− α0pij −
∑
b
αbpij · 1{yi∈Yb} + PEVj · µ′iβPEV + PHEVj · µ′iβPHEV + δjm + εij




Xj = [1, hpj , lwj , rangej , mp$j , PEVj , PHEVj ].
11 Since zip codes are not geographically contiguous areas, we specifically use zcta5 designations.
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The index b is used to indicate income bin. We choose this specification over the
standard log form to permit non-monotonicity in price elasticity over income groups.
Xj is a vector of characteristics for vehicle j, including standard quality controls and
indicators for whether the vehicle is a fully electric vehicle (PEVj) or a hybrid electric
vehicle (PHEVj). ξjm is an unobserved product-specific demand shock, which can be
correlated with net price pij and εij is an idiosyncratic preference shock. Although we
already define vehicle j as specific to a market, we leave the subscript m in to emphasize
that a single car model may have characteristics that change with this specific market.
The full set of parameters of interest in this utility model are
θ = (α0, {αb}b, (βPEV )′, (βPHEV )′, β′)′.
In Equation 3.1 the terms specific to PEVs are highlighted to emphasize additions
to the standard models.
uij = δjm(θ) + Vij(θ) + EVij(θ) + εij (3.1)
where δjm = X
′
jβ + ξjm




EVij(θ) = PEVj · µ′iβPEV + PHEVj · µ′iβPHEV
The interactions in EVij(θ) allow additionally flexibility in consumer elasticity to price
subsidies and charging stations. As we found in Section 3.3, while lower income in-
dividuals are more price elastic, the net effect of a subsidy is higher for high income
individuals because of their significantly higher taste for EVs. These interaction terms
leave a horse race between price elasticity and tastes open to the empirical findings.
To construct shares from the model we impose the additional that εij shocks are
i.i.d. type-1 extreme value over products and consumers. Under this assumption the
probability consumer i in market m purchases vehicle j takes on the familiar logit form.
Pθ(j|Wij , Di) = exp(δjm(θ) + Vij(θ) + EVij(θ))
1 +
∑
j′∈Jm exp(δj′m(θ) + Vij′(θ) + EVij′(θ))
where Wij = (Xj , pij). Integrating over all of the individuals in a market yields the
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aggregate market share. We allow the distribution of individual characteristics to differ
by market according to fm(y, poli, d, c) and assume the distribution of each component
is independent from the others. Hence fm(y, poli, d, c) = fm(y)fm(poli)fm(d)fm(c). We
now add the assumption that price discounts are the same for any consumers in the
same market.12 This implies Wij ≡ Wmj for all i in the same market. Under these
assumptions the market share for vehicle j in market m is
Smj (θ|Wmj) =
∫
Pθ(j|Wmj , Di)fm(y, poli, d, c)d(y, poli, d, c)
3.6 Estimation
3.6.1 Reducing the Parameter Space
To simplify the estimation we reduce our parameter space by a standard technique in
the literature. Recall from Equation 3.1, δjm(θ) = Xjβ + ξjm, the product-specific
term common to all consumers in a market. Because the mean parameters β are linear
in δ, we can back out estimates for them after a nonlinear search over δ. Therefore,
we refine θ = (α0, {αb}b, (βPEV )′, (βPHEV )′)′. Searching over the J components of δ
is expensive, however, so we utilize the share inversion technique introduced by Berry
(1994) to “concentrate out” these parameters. This technique requires the restriction
that CA-level vehicle shares should match the predicted shares generated by the model
at the true parameter values. That is
SDATAj − Smj (δjm, θ0) = 0 ∀j,m (3.2)
Given our distributional assumption on consumer tastes, Berry (1994) demonstrates
that for each θ, there is a unique δ(θ) such that Equation 3.2 holds. This technique
proves useful not only as a mechanism to reduce the parameter space but also to mitigate
the endogeneity problem with price by conditioning on the component of the error with
which it is correlated, i.e. ξjm. Given this restriction three types of moments identify
the parameters θ.
12 Effectively this is an assumption that everyone will take up the subsidy offered.
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3.6.2 Maximum Likelihood Moments
The first set of moments are the score of a maximum simulated likelihood estimator of θ
using the IHS micro purchase data M = {Mi}Ni=1. Estimators using this sample can take
advantage of much greater variation in charging stations and purchasing observations
across zip codes and quarters than could aggregated data.
Because we observe the time of purchase, model of purchase, and location of indi-
viduals in this dataset, it is straightforward to write down a likelihood function. For
consumer i in market m let Iij(i) be a vector of length Jm by 1 of purchase indicators
(1 for the vehicle the consumer purchased and specially denoted Iij(i)). Conditional on
all relevant characteristics of person i, i.e. Di, the log probability of observing Ii under











Following the argument of Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) we claim that conditioning pur-
chase probability calculations on the value of δ(θ) described previously eliminates the
specification error that might arise because of the endogeneity of price.
However, the available data in Mi for the individual does not include income, politi-
cal affiliation, or work location so the probability of purchase must still be simulated for
each individual by integrating over the distribution fm(y, poli, d, c). With the simulated


























3.6.3 Matching Income Distribution Moments
The second set of moments takes advantage of aggregated demographic statistics derived
from survey participants in the CHTS and a survey of CVRP participants, data sets
denoted by A = {Ar}Rr=1 and B = {Bl}Ll=1, respectively. Following the insight of Imbens
and Lancaster (1994) these aggregated statistics are simply aggregations of micro data;
hence aggregate model predictions should match these statistics. Similar to matching
moments considered by Petrin (2002) we consider three conditions matching observed
income distributions of various categories of car purchasers against model predictions.
The first condition matches 5 income category densities conditional on purchasing
a Tesla or another electric vehicle. Using the data from the CVRP survey and invoking
Bayes’ rule, i.e. P (A|B) = P (A,B)/P (B), the sample statistics derived are
µˆ(yi ∈ Yb|i purchases EV) =
∑L
i=1 1(i purchases EV) ∗ 1(yi ∈ Yb)∑L
i=1 1(i purchases EV)
for b ∈ {0, . . . , 4}. We assume that the samples are unbiased so the sampling error is 0 in
expectation.13 We will denote the population version of this probability distribution
by µ = E[Pˆ (yi ∈ Yb|i purchases EV)], where the expectation is taken over sampling
error.
The corresponding statistics generated by model predictions are












where pim is a population weight for the particular market.
The moment restriction imposes that at the true parameter the model’s aggregated
statistic and the population statistic should be equal.
E[ψ2(θ0, B)] ≡ µ(yi ∈ Yb|i purchases EV)− Pθ0(yi ∈ Yb|i purchases EV) = 0
We similarly construct matching moments E[ψ3(θ0, A)] = 0 using CHTS data, which
13 This assumption only requires 1) the CVRP participants taking the survey are not a biased sample
of the pool of all CVRP participants and 2) the CHTS sample of households is also not a biased sample
of auto purchasers in California.
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provides information on gas vehicle purchases.
3.6.4 Subsidy Instrument Moments
The third set of moments are instruments based on two sets assumptions. Following
in the spirit Li (2017) we assume that each EV’s demand shock, ξjm, in a market is
independent of the price subsidy for that vehicle in the same market. First, federal
and state-wide subsidies are set independent of idiosyncratic granular market demand.
Second, local subsidies are frequently set to combat pollution issues. For example, the
San Joaquin River Valley has the highest local subsidies, as shown in Figure 3.5. It also
has the worst pollution in California for reasons only in part from vehicle emissions.14
Let svjm be the subsidy for vehicle j in market m. Then, at true parameter θ0 we have
the moment condition
E[ψ4(θ0,M)] ≡ E[ξjm(θ0)svjm] = 0
To construct the second instrument moments, we assume that the innovation in
unobserved demand shocks evolve as a random walk:
νjm(θ) = ξjg(m)t(m)(θ)− ξjg(m)t(m)−1(θ)
where g(m) and t(m) are explicitly indexed to note an evolution of the shock in a
district over time. To generate the moment condition we assume that the innovation of
the shock is uncorrelated with the subsidy for the charging station scjm, as a cost shifter,
in the market.





These five sets moments can be stacked into a single vector. Formally, we assume that
θ0 uniquely satisfies the population moment conditions described above.









with sample analog ψˆ(θ, U), where U = (M,A,B). The GMM estimator θˆ solves the
following criterion function
θˆ = arg min
θ
ψˆ(θ)′Wψˆ(θ)
where W is a weighting matrix. In practice we follow the Hansen (1982) two-step
method, by first estimating parameters where W is the identity matrix and then with




Identifying parameters on terms related to PEVs rely on our data specific to PEV
purchases, in particular our rich micro dataset from the CVRP. Because electric vehicles,
particularly plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, are similar in performance and range to
traditional gas-powered vehicles, differences in shares of these electric vehicles from
similar gasoline vehicles must be driven largely by PEV-specific tastes.
We also observe significant variation in purchases of electric vehicles as a cate-
gory and within that category across counties and time. Across geographic markets
consumers differ on three dimensions that can explain purchasing behavior: charging
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stations, income, and political affiliation, and importantly subsidies that shift costs dif-
ferentially across the state. The latter two vary most across geographic markets rather
than time, while charging stations vary significantly even over short periods of time as
well as across counties. Fixing the number of charging stations at a snapshot in time
can thus help pin down income and political orientation parameters.15
Significant variation in the number of charging stations across time within markets
can pin down parameters relating to charging stations. Because markets are defined by
time periods as short as a quarter, we do not worry about general improvements in the
perception of electric vehicle usage absorbing most of the change in purchase behavior
of PEVs from quarter to quarter. Additionally, given a market, the only area-specific
factors that significantly change over this short time period are the number of charging
stations.16
3.7.2 Endogeneity
Two sources of endogeneity could potentially affect the estimation procedure. The first
is the typical assumption that unobserved product characteristics ξj are correlated with
price pj . A priori these two variables should be positively correlated and generate a
positive bias in price elasticity (price elasticity is less negative). Because electric vehicles
still tend to carry a higher price than similar gasoline equivalents, the model with bias
price would predict consumers are less hesitant to buy high-price electric vehicles than at
the true parameter. Ultimately, the bias can force down the magnitude of PEV-specific
utility terms to explain the low shares of electric vehicles. As detailed in section 3.6 we
address this issue with the standard tactic in this literature by directly specifying the
component of the error with which price is correlated (ξj) in our calculation of demand.
A more serious issue for analysis is the potential that charging stations are also
endogenous. While we expect demand to increase the number of charging stations, it is
also reasonable to suspect the number of charging stations in an area are driven by local
15 See again, for example, Table 3.11.
16 One concern is that charging stations are always increasing over time; we do not observe many
instances of charging stations being shut down. We intend to make our results more robust by considering
a more natural definition for charging stations, which considers congestion. Effective charging stations
by this definition do not necessarily increase over time hence breaking the potential conflation of time
and charging stations.
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demand. The final set of moments in the estimation aim to address this issue directly by
claiming that local area CS subsidies are independent from temporary demand shocks.
We also argue that special features of the market mitigate these concerns. First,
government programs determined the location of many early charging stations in the
market. In conversations with representatives involved in these projects, we learned
that the government targeted large areas, such as Los Angeles or San Diego, for receipt
of charging stations but specific locations were determined independent of demand.
The projects placed charging stations wherever willing partners could be found. The
potential endogeneity problem can then be mitigated by 1) blunt placement of charging
stations and 2) considering consumers at the high level of granularity we do.
Finally, charging stations might trend with market-level shocks favoring electric
vehicles. Since ξj for PEV vehicles is precisely this shock, specifying this component in
the calculation of demand mitigates the endogeneity problem.17
3.8 Conclusion
This paper aims to estimate the heterogeneous effect of subsidy and investment on
charging station infrastructure and suggests the optimal allocation of funding to promote
electric vehicle diffusion. This draft takes a preliminary step toward that goal by setting
up a rich discrete choice model of demand with heterogeneous tastes toward the charging
station network as well as price elasticities in a static setting. These modeling decisions
are informed by the results in Section 3.3, suggesting the importance of these dimensions
of heterogeneity. Even this preliminary model can use zip code level vehicle registration
data to identify marginal consumers with respect to subsidy, characterized by income,
political preference, or residential location. We also specify the marginal benefit of
charging stations by their locations.
We believe this paper will offer a number of contributions to the existing literature.
First, we can evaluate the potential loss of current incentive programs. Unlike almost
all other government subsidy (tax) schedules, most EV incentives do not discriminate
17 Of course, if the number of charging stations is actually highly correlated with shocks specific to a
tight array, specifying ξj will not completely eliminate the endogeneity problem. In this case, we would
need a more sophisticated model of how charging stations are placed. A future iteration on this paper
may revisit that question.
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based on demographics and geography. We plan to evaluate the loss from the flat
incentive structure compared to a socially optimal schedule, perfect discrimination based
on consumer characteristics and location. We can also measure the loss by comparing
it to several constrained optima more in line with realistic policy, since discrimination
based on political views, for example, is untenable.
Second, we can provide a practical guideline in designing subsidy and investment in
infrastructure that can be implemented. The federal tax credit, state rebate programs,
and other incentive programs are still ongoing and are constantly changing their design
to target different groups of potential EV buyers.
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3.9 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Top 4 PEV and PHEV Models in California
Model Type Qa Share Price Range MP$b
Tesla Model S PEV 9013 22.13 64931 256.57 18.95
Nissan Leaf 7046 17.30 27929 84.68 22.44
Tesla Model X 6073 14.91 74000 200.00 18.03
Fiat 500e 5780 14.19 28721 85.80 22.89
Chevrolet Volt PHEV 9812 34.63 32600 396.67 10.89
Toyota Prius Plug-in 6745 23.80 27484 540.00 13.74
Ford C-Max 5432 19.17 22031 554.00 11.39
Hyundai Sonata Plug-in Hybrid 2115 7.46 34600 595.00 13.29
a Source: IHS dataset of registrations by car model. Data aggregated over 2014 to 2016.
b Miles per dollar (MP$) is calculated assuming average time-of-use rate offered by util-
ity companies in California. Miles per gallon for PEVs is substituted by MPGe, which
uses the equivalency 33.7kWh = 1 gallon.
Table 3.2: Charging Speed by Charger Type
Charger Type Vehicle Level 1 Level 2 DC Fast
Full Charge Time LEAF 20 hr 8 hr 30 minsa
Volt 10 hr 4 hr 15 minsa
Distance with 1 hr of Charge 2-5 mi 10-20 mi 60 mi
Home Installation Fee Free ∼$1700 N/A
aTime for battery to be 80% charged.
Table 3.3: Desired Range Vs. Actual Range
Leaf Volt Prius
Desired Electric Range 200 100 50
Actual Electric Range 78 38 12
Dissatisfaction with Public Charging Infrastructure 71%
Source: California Plug-in Electric Vehicle Driver Survey Results, February
2014
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Figure 3.1: Dissatisfaction with Charging Infrastructure
Source: California Plug-in Electric Vehicle Driver Survey Results, February 2014
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Table 3.4: Cumulative Charging Stations in California
Year Quarter Cumulative Stations Cumulative Private Cumulative Public
2010 1 734 364 370
2010 2 746 370 376
2010 3 752 370 382
2010 4 799 373 426
2011 1 927 384 543
2011 2 1243 486 757
2011 3 1410 531 879
2011 4 1759 569 1190
2012 1 2220 657 1563
2012 2 2770 765 2005
2014 1 4908 992 3916
2014 2 5214 1005 4209
2014 3 5659 1056 4603
2014 4 6355 1124 5231
2015 1 7008 1197 5811
2015 2 7803 1319 6484
2015 3 8792 1377 7415
2015 4 9382 1477 7905
2016 1 10634 1686 8948
2016 2 11294 1719 9575
2016 3 12182 1815 10367
2016 4 12904 1862 11042
Source: AFDC and OpenChargeMap
Table 3.5: Sponsored Charging Infrastructure Projects
EV Project ChargePoint America
Project Period January 2011 - December 2013 May 2011 - June 2013
Area Covered in CA Los Angeles, San Diego Los Angeles
San Francisco Sacramento, San Francisco
Charging Network Blink ChargePoint
Funding Amount $130 million dollara $18.4 million dollar
Total Charging Unitsb 3182 1916
Public Charging Units 933 857
Sources: Project Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Summary Report (Q4 2013),
ChargePoint America Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Summary Report
a Total budget was $230 million and half of it was funded by the DOE. $130 was allocated
to install public or private charging stations. The rest is operational cost and subsidy for
residential chargers.
b Charging units are counted only in California.
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Figure 3.2: Public Charging Station Subsidy Availability, December 2016
Source: Local subsidies by zip code are available on driveclean.ca.gov.
Table 3.6: Charging and Driving Behavior
LA SD SF CAb
Leaf Volt Leaf Volt Leaf Volt Gas Only
Avg Trip Distancea 6.4 7.7 6.6 8.2 7.3 9.39 8.4
Avg Distance per Day 24.8 38 26.7 39.6 27.4 41.4 38.48
Avg Number of Trips b/w Charging Events 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.5 3
Avg Distance b/w Charging Events 24.2 28.9 24.6 30.1 25.7 28.1
Avg Charging Events per Day 1 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.5
% Charging Events Away from Home 30 23 23 21 28 21
Sources: EV Project Nissan Leaf Summary Report, Q4 2013; EV Project Chevrolet Volt Summary Re-
port, Q4 2013; 2010-2012 California Household Travel Survey
a Distance is measured in miles. https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DdQHH6yWAAAmxB6.jpg
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Figure 3.3: Charging Access at Work is Important
Source: California Plug-in Electric Vehicle Driver Survey
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Battery Charge at the Start of Charging Events
Source: EV Project Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Summary Report, Q4 2013
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Table 3.7: Government Monetary Incentives for PEV
Clean Vehicle Rebate Project Federal Tax Creditsa
Project Period 2010 - current 2009 - current
Area Covered in CA All All
Funding Institute California Air Resources Board IRS
Funding Amount $790 million dollarb Until manufacturer sells 200,000
Rebate Amount $1,500 to $2,500c $2,500 to $7,500
Tesla/Leaf Rebate $2,500 $7,500
Prius Rebate $1,500 $2,500
Eligibility Zero emission, plug-in hybrid Zero emission, plug-in hybrid
Lease ≥ 36 months Battery capacity ≥ 5Kilowatt-hour
Total Rebates Issuedd 236,258
a Plug-in Electric Drive Vehicle Credit (IRC 30D) by IRS
b Funding allocation during FY 2010 - 2018.
c Starting March 29, 2016 income cap has been implemented and rebates have increased for low
and moderate income buyers.
d As of February 28, 2018.
Figure 3.5: Full-Electric Vehicle Subsidy Available, December 2016
Source: Local subsidies by zip code are available on driveclean.ca.gov.
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Table 3.8: Income Distribution Conditional on a Vehicle or PEV Purchase
Income 2010-2012 Vehicle Purchase PEV Purchase
Less than $74,999 0.19 0.07
$75,000 to $99,999 0.16 0.10
$100,000 to $149,999 0.27 0.24
$150,000 to $199,999 0.20 0.23
$200,000 to $249,999 0.09 0.15
More than $250,000 0.10 0.22
Number of Obs 278 92
Source: California Department of Transportation CA Household Travel Survey
Income 2012-2014 Overall Tesla
Less than $49,999 0.03 0.01
$50,000 to $74,999 0.05 0.02
$75,000 to $99,999 0.10 0.03
$100,000 to $149,999 0.25 0.11
$150,000 to $199,999 0.19 0.13
$200,000 to $299,999 0.20 0.22
$300,000 to $399,999 0.08 0.13
$400,000 to $499,999 0.03 0.07
$500,000 or more 0.07 0.28
Number of Obs 5596 1052
Source: Clean Vehicle Rebate Project EV Owner Demographics and Diffusion Survey
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Table 3.9: Poisson Regression of Electric Vehicles Sold, by Model
Radius Around Zip Code Centroid
20mi 10mi 5mi 2mi 1mi .5mi
2nd Inc. Quantile 1.786*** 1.800*** 1.784*** 1.782*** 1.780*** 1.773***
(0.250) (0.250) (0.242) (0.240) (0.240) (0.237)
3rd Inc. Quantile 2.345*** 2.355*** 2.342*** 2.357*** 2.359*** 2.347***
(0.327) (0.314) (0.314) (0.319) (0.323) (0.316)
Top Inc. Quantile 3.259*** 3.261*** 3.259*** 3.275*** 3.280*** 3.247***
(0.496) (0.472) (0.474) (0.478) (0.485) (0.470)
Net Price 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.966***
(0.00368) (0.00373) (0.00375) (0.00373) (0.00373) (0.00373)
2nd Inc. Quantile 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999
x Net Price (0.00186) (0.00188) (0.00190) (0.00192) (0.00192) (0.00191)
3rd Inc. Quantile 1.005*** 1.005*** 1.005*** 1.005*** 1.005*** 1.005***
x Net Price (0.00200) (0.00203) (0.00205) (0.00205) (0.00205) (0.00204)
Top Inc. Quantile 1.017*** 1.017*** 1.017*** 1.017*** 1.017*** 1.017***
x Net Price (0.00342) (0.00347) (0.00349) (0.00347) (0.00346) (0.00345)
Horsepower / 1.33e-07*** 1.31e-07*** 1.33e-07*** 1.34e-07*** 1.33e-07*** 1.33e-07***
Weight (2.53e-07) (2.51e-07) (2.55e-07) (2.58e-07) (2.57e-07) (2.56e-07)
Length / 7.548*** 7.545*** 7.551*** 7.553*** 7.550*** 7.549***
Width (1.856) (1.856) (1.862) (1.871) (1.870) (1.870)
Range 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003***
(0.000176) (0.000178) (0.000177) (0.000176) (0.000176) (0.000176)
Miles per Dollar 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Distance to Work 0.996* 0.99* 0.996* 0.996** 0.996** 0.996**
(0.00185) (0.00187) (0.00192) (0.00193) (0.00196) (0.00198)
Home Stations 1.002*** 1.003*** 1.004*** 1.005** 1.004 0.997
within Radius (0.000512) (0.000521) (0.00144) (0.00196) (0.00411) (0.00570)
Work Stations 0.999** 1.000 1.002* 1.011*** 1.029*** 1.085***
within Radius (0.000528) (0.000532) (0.00107) (0.00294) (0.00758) (0.0227)
Observations 175747 175747 175747 175747 175747 175747
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < .05, * p < .1; Coefficients reported are exp(β).
Observations are at the level of zip code-quarter-car model.
123
Table 3.10: CHTS and CVRP Survey Summary
CHTSa CVRPb
Survey Period 2010 - 2012 Oct 2013 - May 2014
Vehicle Purchase Period 1994 - 2012 Sept 2012 - Apr 2014
Number of Respondents 42,431 8,415
Sample Used 1588 6,602
Car Purchase 278 6,602
PEV Purchase 92 6,602
a California Department of Transportation CA Household Travel Survey. CVRP surveyed only PEV
purchasers who applied for CVRP rebate.
b Clean Vehicle Rebate Project EV Owner Demographics and Diffusion Survey.
In the micro income moments we only used the samples which has the income and purchase year are
known.
Figure 3.6: Heterogeneous Income and Political Distribution by County
Source: Federal Elections Commission
Political preference: -1 if Democrats, 1 if Republicans, 0 if independent
Income group: percentile of FEC donation given county
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Table 3.11: Heterogeneous Income and Political Distribution by County
County Incomea PEVb LEAF/Voltc
Orange $96,036 8.44 0.72
San Francisco and Marin $108,690 5.68 1.54
Riverside $69,835 2.61 0.62
Sacramento $68,532 2.73 2.15
a Average household income in 2013, ACS
b Total PEV sold per 1,000 capita until August 2014, Clean
Vehicle Rebate Project rebate dataset
c Leaf/Volt: ratio between Leaf and Volt demand
Table 3.12: LODES Residence and Workplace Summary
Year Total Unique Census Blocks Unique Zip Codes Distance
People Home Work Avg. Linka Home Work Avg. Linka Mean Med
2012 14.59m 380564 235288 1.01 1757 1742 21.26 22.85 5
2013 15.05m 380762 237490 1.01 1760 1745 21.42 23.59 5
2014 15.47m 381181 240242 1.01 1758 1746 18.77 26.61 5
Total – – 397471 265663 1.01 1760 1752 20.38 24.39 5
Source: 2012-2014 Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics Origin-Destination Employment
Statistics (LODES)
a Measured as the average number of people in home area commuting to the work area
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data Sources and Construction
This appendix goes into more detail about the collection and scope of raw data sources.
The following appendix explains how these data are transformed for use in the model
estimation.
A.1.1 Collecting Uber and Lyft Characteristic Data
To collect information on the characteristics of Uber services (and Lyft), I emulated
two Android phones set up with the applications (app) for Uber and Lyft from March
through June 2016. Figure A.1 depicts the Uber app from the time of collection.1
I automated the applications to feed the apps the locations depicted in Figure A.2 at
specific times throughout the collection period. The Uber app ran every hour and a half,
and the Lyft every forty-five minutes. Locations were sampled in the same sequence for
every run but in an order to minimize the time between collecting information for each
general area.
For Uber I collected data on UberPOOL, UberX, UberXL, Uber BLACK, and Uber
SUV, though I use the low-cost UberX as the de facto Uber choice. Specifically, I scraped
the information visible in Figure A.1. The ETA, i.e. “wait time” was of particular
1 The Uber has updated their application for significant changes since mid 2016. A critical, and
perhaps behavior-changing, update was to report estimated ride prices before confirming the process.




interest. Once the automator “clicked” SET PICKUP LOCATION, the app revealed the
surge multiplier.
I also collected data on Lyft Standard, Lyft Plus, and Lyft Courier, using Lyft
Standard as the de facto Lyft choice. I managed to capture the web traffic from the
Lyft app in which details on the pricing scheme for the particular ride — Lyft had no
visible surge multiplier like Uber — and wait time were available.
Figure A.1: Image Captured from Uber Application
A.1.2 Constructing Wait Time Data
Before delving into the specific method to simulate wait times, I first illustrate how I
would use information on cab movements and images from traffic cameras in an idealized
setting to deliver a probabilistic count of the taxi in each location. Figure A.3 depicts a
stylized city with one taxi. The cab starts on green (node L) at time 0, after completing
a drop off, and ends at red (node A) at time 5 for its next pick up. Traversing any
street segment takes one time period.
The first step is to consider the potential streets the taxi could have crossed. Given
I know travel time, the start, and the end of the trip, the cab could have taken the
following routes: LKJGDA, LIFCBA, LIFEDA, LIFEBA. I assume at first each of
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Figure A.3: Stylized City with One Taxi
these time-consistent routes is equally likely. Therefore, for example, the probability a
cab was on street segment LI at this time is 75%. With additional taxis, I could develop
an estimate of the expected time between two cabs passing on segment LI. This would
be the construction of the wait time for a consumer on street segment LI. In the simplest
case, suppose I observe a repeat of the same trip every six periods. The expected wait
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time in periods comes from the survival analog of an exponential distribution with rate
parameter .75 ∗ 1/6. Similarly, the expected wait time on segment LK would be 24
periods.
The addition of traffic cameras helps pin down what route the taxi is taking. Suppose
I now have access to cameras at every intersection in the city. At t = 4 I find a taxi
crossing node D. This additional information narrows down the possible routes this cab
could have taken down to only LKJGDA. I can in turn use this information to refine
my estimate of the wait time for passengers throughout the city.
Taking this procedure to the full data steps quite far from the idealized example,
but the intuition of converting the probabilistic positions of taxis into consumer wait
times remains the same. Three particular sets of features distinguish reality from the
idyllic city in Figure A.3. First, many thousands of taxis are simultaneously searching
the city. Second, since 2013, the taxi pick up and drop off data from the TLC does not
permit tracking taxis over the course of the day. This is irrelevant in the simple example,
but potentially important in a city with more than two taxis. Third, the roads of New
York City are significantly more complicated and permit far more route permutations
between two points in a given time.
The following algorithm details the procedure by which I estimate wait times. In
brief the procedure works by checking how far a cab can get without picking up another
passenger. Once a potential cab is a assigned a next pickup, the latter of which I
observe in data, probability weights are assigned to segments in the fashion described
in the simple example. The role of the camera images are similar to how the pickups
are used. Both sets of data essentially tag locations and times for when a cab must be
in that location.
The algorithm accelerates time t by one minute through every iteration. Once a
cab c makes a drop off, it is assigned a vintage starting at zero. The next period it
is assigned to all street segments accessible within one minute. Naturally, the areas
it could be in any period explode quickly, so two assumptions help with tractability:
cabs cannot double back and are disappeared after 20 periods if they are not assigned
pickup or a camera tag. The object V , a matrix of size L, the number of locations, by
20 keeps track of a count of assigned cabs by vintage for each location. For each active
cab in the algorithm, I track cs, the starting location, and vintage cv. These two are
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sufficient information to determine where the cab could have traveled in the time period.
Finally, P is matrix of size L by T , the number of time periods, holding the probabilistic
count of cabs in each location at each time in the day. After the algorithm runs for the
desired period of time (4 AM to 4 AM in my sample), wait times throughout the day
are constructed using the probabililistic locations of cabs through an approximation of
the survival function). The algorithm “burns in” using an arbitrary day to generate a
starting C. I typically choose Sunday to prepare the algorithm to run for the weekdays.
Algorithm 4: Taxi Wait Time Algorithm
1 Set t = 0
2 while t < T do
3 Check drop offs at time t and update the first column of V
4 Assign all pickups to an arbitrary taxi in the location with priority to the
oldest vintage
5 Subtract these cabs from V
6 Update P by evenly weighting the routes the cab could take from cs(l) to cv(l)
7 Assign camera images to an arbitrary taxi with priority
8 Update P by evenly weighting the routes the cab could take from cs(l) to cv(l)
9 Reset these cabs as vintage 0 and reset its starting location
10 Increment cab vintages and update V
11 Remove all vintage 21 cabs
12 Set t = t+ 1
13 end
With P , it is straightforward to calculate wait times with an approximated survival
function. The calculation follows formula in Equation 1.12 with the probability of a cab
passing through the segment in any t using the weights in P and checking up to x = 60.
One issue with extending this algorithm to other time periods is that I only have
camera images processed from the end of 2015. To extend the value of the camera
information, I assume that the marginal impact of the camera data on P uncovers a
propensity for cabs to travel certain routes and street segments.2 To capture this
effect, I run the algorithm twice in the relevant months of 2015; I run it once with
the camera data and once without. For each time period, the relative difference in the
probability counts of each street segment I take as something analogous to a fixed effect
2 I am implicitly, and now explicitly, assuming that these favored routes do note change with the
entrance of competitors.
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for that time period. I then apply this same weighting to P for periods when the camera
data is not available.
One concern about this procedure is that it lacks any measure of external validity.
This is an important issue to revisit in future iterations of this work.
A.1.3 Classifying For-Hire Vehicle Data
The pickup data for FHVs provided by the TLC does not explicitly list which company
the consumer contracted for the ride. It does, however, list the base station linked to
the particular ride. The TLC provides separate documentation with the name of the
company operating each base station as well the name (“doing business as”) under which
that station operations. I separate Uber pickups from pickups of other FHV companies
on the criterion that “Uber” appears in the DBA name of the linked base station.
A lucky quirk in the TLC release of data allows me to check the veracity of this
methodology. The TLC released a separate dataset of exclusively Uber pickups for only
the first six months of 2015, a time period also covered by my standard FHV dataset.
For the purpose of this comparison, I will call the Uber data from the full FHV dataset
“implied Uber” and the other dataset “true Uber.”
The first check compares the total Uber and implied Uber pickups on any given day.
On average the implied Uber dataset yields 3.6% fewer rides than the true dataset. At
worst it missed 4.1% and at best 3.2%. Hence, in a given day the implied Uber dataset
tends to understate the total pickups. In the demand estimation this should manifest
as a slightly underestimated unobserved quality term for Uber. But, one might worry
still that the bias is not random with respect to time of day or location. The next two
tests check this issue.
Unsurprisingly, for both the location- and time-based comparisons the implied Uber
dataset uniformly understates the total pickups. By location the implied dataset on
average yields 3.9% fewer rides than the true dataset. At best the two datasets perfectly
match up, but at worst the implied dataset misses up to 16.7% of the rides in the true
dataset. Figure A.4 shows the distribution of the understatement. Fortunately the vast
majority of locations feature deviations of a similar magnitude. Finally, I checked the
difference between the two datasets by half-hour segments of the day. On average the
implied dataset gives 3.6% fewer rides than the true dataset. The range of the deviations
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is otherwise tight; at best the understatement is 3.3% and at worst 4.2%.
Figure A.4: Deviation of Implied Uber Dataset from True Dataset
Note: The frequency distribution is calculated using deviations at locations as individual
observations.
A.1.4 Determining Morning Taxi Commutes
For a fine granularity, e.g. census tracts, the American Community Survey does not
report taxi usage separately from other means of transit. Along with the fact that the
ACS data is taken over a long period of time and the personal vehicle segment of the
transportation market is rapidly changing, I instead opt to construct commuting data
from the rich TLC data set. Unfortunately, the dataset does not distinguish between
the purpose of various trips. This section describes the procedure to extract commuting
data from the raw TLC trip information.
I use the an algorithm to sort through the taxi commute observations and determine
which should be classified as work rides based on two criteria:
1. the “same” ride appears in the dataset within γ1 days; and
2. the “same” ride appears on that day within γ2 hours of the first day.
To be explicit designate a trip record as rdtll′ , where l designates the identified starting
census tract, l′ designates the ending tract, d is the date, and t is the time of day. Only
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rides associated with the same starting and ending tract pair are compared so we can
drop the ll′ notation. Let R be the set of all trip records which will be compared. For
each record rdt ∈ R, the algorithm extracts a subset Rdt = {rij ∈ R : i ∈ [d − γ1, d +
γ1], j ∈ [t−γ2, t+γ2]}. If Rdt is not the empty set, record rdt is designated a commuting
trip.
Ultimately, “typical” commuting choices are of interest, rather than day-to-day de-
cisions. To convert the trip-level commuting designations into a tract-level measure of
cab usage comparable to the data available from the census, a measure of “typical” cab
usage is constructed. I simply take the average number of commute trips per day over
an extended period of time.
To calibrate the parameters γ1 and γ2, I match predicted taxi commute usage to
PUMS-calculated usage for 2009 to 2012, prior to the introduction of green cabs, by
year and PUMA in lower Manhattan, i.e. the yellow-taxi exclusive zone depicted in
Figure 1.1. Designate L = {l¯} the set of PUMAs, which is itself a collection of tracts.
Let ft(l, γ1, γ2) be the number of typical taxi commuters identified by the algorithm for
tract l in year t and fDatat (l¯) the commuters identified by PUMS data for PUMA l¯. γ1









ft(l, γ1, γ2)− fDatat (l¯)
2
subject to γ1 ∈ Z
(A.1)
The algorithm works on the assumption that people generally leave for work at the same
time of day while not necessarily taking a cab every day.
For Uber, I conduct the same exercise using 2014 data in which the TLC-released
Uber data is comparable to that available for yellow taxis. I then lump Uber rides in
with those of traditional taxis and re-solve Equation A.1 matching 2014 PUMS data.
Because later Uber data does not include the destination of the trip, I am unable to use
these parameters in later years to tease out which Uber trips are allegedly for morning
commutes. Instead I calculate the fraction of trips identified in 2014 as commuting trips
and assume that fraction holds over time.
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A.1.5 Routing
An important feature of the choice dataset is the time each option takes and how much
walking is required as part of that choice. Unfortunately, little of this information is
available in the datasets. The one partial exception is that the TLC data does note the
time taken to complete realized taxi trips. For walking, transit, driving, and for-hire
vehicles in areas with few recorded trips, I use a mix of OpenTripPlanner — an open-
source route planning program, much like Google Maps — and a separately built graph
of NYC’s road network, based on the LION geographic database of NYC streets. 3
Mechanically OpenTripPlanner functions similarly enough to Google Maps that it is
not worth detailed explanation. A key difference, however, is that the former can be used
with arbitrary public transit schedules stored in the General Transit Feed Specification
(GTFS) format. For 2016, for example, I utilize the transit schedules published for
2016. While historic, off-schedule delays could also be incorporated, they have not at
this time.4
Three pieces of data are fed into the routing program: starting location, ending
location, and time of departure. Simulated and survey individuals assigned to a census
tract are assumed to start from the centroid of their tract and travel to the centroid of
their work tract. Individuals in the travel survey start their trip at the time indicated
in the survey while simulated individuals leave at the start of their designated half hour
slot. One concern might be that the rough departure assignment overstates the waiting
time. For example, I assume a commuter leaves her house at 9:00AM for a proximal
train leaving at 9:15AM. Like Google Maps Directions, the wait time at the beginning
of the trip is shaved off. Only the time waiting for transfers counts toward the total
wait time for that trip.
Vehicle trips are routed through a custom-made graph of New York City’s street
network. Simulated and survey individuals are again assumed to start from the centroid
of their tract and travel to the centroid of their work tract. Unlike OpenTripPlanner,
however, traffic speeds are approximated using data on cab travel time from when the
trip was taken.
3 From source http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/data-maps/open-data/dwn-lion.page
4 On average one rests on the hope that the official schedules are correct, but the NYC MTA is
becoming more notorious for its delays.
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A.2 General Appendix
A.2.1 Uber’s Expansion Pattern Across Geographies
This appendix expands on Section 1.2 by linking changes in the NYC taxi market more
closely to density in parts of the city. Again, I use the ratio of building area to ground
area in the various taxi zones of the city as the measure of density. Figure 1.7 depicts
density using this metric. Ultimately, this density measure is inappropriate for areas
where people congregate in wide space, e.g. parks, and where people magically appear,
e.g. airports and train terminals. These zones are thus eliminated from the analysis in
this section and noted by a checkered overlay in Figure 1.7.
I use this measure of density to illustrate two key facts about Uber’s expansion from
2014 to 2016. The first is that market activity in area has grown in terms of total
pickups with the sparsity of that area. In the densest areas Uber simply substitutes the
existing incumbents. The second notes that Uber dominates in the sparsest areas and
most of its growth since 2014 has been redirected to these locales. These results are
preliminary evidence of the relative technology position of Uber and incumbents across
areas of different density.
The analysis proceeds under the framework of spatial autoregressive models with a
spatial lag. The model is attractive because of several issues present which exacerbate
the potential for bias introduced by spatial correlation. First, incumbent taxis and Uber
both benefit from local scale and the primary units of analysis, the taxi zones, are not
isolated from each other. Unobserved characteristics impacting the variables of interest
surely spill over these geographic boundaries. Second, the key regressor, density, is also
highly spatially correlated. The general model for these regressions is
Yi = βXi + ρWYi + εi (A.2)
The elements in the neighborhood matrix W are defined by
wij =

1 if i borders j
0 if i = j
0 all other cases
(A.3)
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with ρ serving as the spatial correlation parameter. The unit of analysis is all taxi zones
not excluded by the criterion mentioned above for each month January to June 2015
and 2016. Table A.1 offers relevant summary statistics for the regressions in and out of
the green exclusion zone.
Table A.1: Summary Statistics for SAR
Inside the Exclusion Zone Outside the Exclusion Zone
Mean 5th Pctile 95th Pctile Mean 5th Pctile 95th Pctile
Density 4.212 1.579 9.651 0.687 0.007 1.492
Daily Ridesa 36945 4861 82343 934 6 5162
Y-Y Growthb 5.08% -2.76% 19.01% 233% 4.28% 1136%
Uber Sharec 23.5% 14.8% 39.0% 69.6% 25.2% 98.1%
a Total daily rides per sq mile by zone, as of March 2016
b Percent change in total rides from March 2015 to 2016
c Uber share of pickups per zone as of March 2016
The second two rows of Table A.1 describe the regressands for the two regression
specifications. Beside the spatial lag of the regressand, each of the regressions addition-
ally fit a quadratic function of density, after density has been normalized to be between
1 and 0, and a dummy for whether the zone is in the green exclusion zone. I fit a
quadratic of density rather than a single term because patterns between the variables
of interest and density tend to break down in the most extreme dense and least dense
zones. The results or all specifications are reported in Table A.2.
The first specification is reported in the first column of Table A.2. The regression
establishes the link between zone density and growth. Less dense markets have enjoyed
greater growth over the time period. These results hold accounting both for the starting
level of rides (“Lag Total”), which appears to be irrelevant, along with the exclusion
zone dummy. The fitted function on density is a U shape but for densities lower than
.15 (roughly 1.5 in unadjusted terms) the predicted growth is higher than the densest
area. As clear from Table A.1, most zones in the outer boroughs fit into this category.
The second specification examines how tightly the substitutions between Uber with
yellow and green taxis (called incumbents in Table A.2 over time follows from the
density of the area. The dependent variable in this set of regressions is the total change
— not percent — in Uber rides from 2015 to 2016 in the given month and taxi zone.
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The additional regressands are the change in yellow and green taxis over the same
time period and that term interacted with density. The key variables of interest in this
regression are these two terms. If Uber and taxis were perfect substitutes in all locations,
the regression would yield −1 on the “incumbent change term”. If instead substitution
increases with density the interaction term should be negative. A coefficient of −1 on
this term would imply that Uber and taxis approach perfect substitutes in the densest
market. Column 2 in Table A.2 shows the latter is indeed the result. In the least dense
locations of NYC the interaction term is dominated by the incumbent change term and
Uber tends to growth with taxis. In the most dense locations incumbent and Uber
growth tend to move in opposite directions with an expected rate of substitution of .67
taxis for each new Uber in the most dense market.
Table A.2: SAR Regressions










Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < .05, * p < .1; Observations are at the month- and
taxi zone-level for January to June over the period 2015 to 2016. The measure of
density defined as zone building area to ground area has been normalized to be
between 0 and 1 or these regressions. Taxis are defined as yellow or green taxis in
these regressions.
A.2.2 Transportation Habits
An important assumption in the consumer choice model is that consumers choose a
single mode of transit to travel from their origin to their destination. The assumption
guarantees a potential consumer’s choice set can be reasonably modeled as a single form
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of transportation.5
To test this assumption I use a transportation survey the Metropolitan Transit
Authority conducted over a random sample of NYC residents in mid-to-late 2008. The
samples were taken to roughly match demographics and residence distributions across
the five boroughs in NYC and within community districts, with locations verified by
the participants’ home addresses. Over 13, 000 households, or 16, 000 people, were
interviewed with each person offering details on an average of 2 trips, including transit
method(s) and destination and origin. These households also provided demographic
details and other relevant information, e.g. what kind of MTA card they hold.
Most importantly, the transit survey allows participants to list up to 16 transit
segments used to get from origin to destination; a segment change might occur when
a passenger switches from one mode of transit to a second or simple at an event like a
bus transfer. Figure A.5 groups the 58, 452 recorded trips by the number of segments.
Figure A.5: Recorded Trips Grouped by Number of Segments
This figure includes segments where passengers, for example, walk from home to
their bus stop. Walking to transit nodes is explicitly modeled so Figure A.6 presents
the same data without walking segments. Nearly 90% of trips feature only one or two
5 One issue that arises from multi-modal transit is the question where mode transitions occur in a
trip and the implications for cost, travel time, etc.
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segments. The problem of modeling a consumer’s choice set is further reduced by noting
that indeed most trips are monomodal. Table A.3 illustrates that monomodal, exclusive
walking, make up almost 85% of the total sample.
Figure A.6: Recorded Trips by Number of Segments, Excluding Walking







Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Route Planning and Timing
Using road data and information on cabs’ drop off and pickup locations, it is possible
to determine the shortest street routes between any two locations by speed or distance.
Calculated speeds for neighborhood areas — Manhattan is broken up into 29 geograph-
ically contiguous neighborhoods — are approximated by hour and day using known
travel distances and times from the TLC dataset for rides that start and end in the
same neighborhood. For Manhattan the volume of rides permits reasonable approxima-
tion of these speeds by day and hour for most hours of every day. For neighborhoods
with less traffic or hours in lower traffic I aggregate up to blocks of four hours and / or
by weekday.
The routing algorithms presume the driver is on a direct path between his / her
starting and ending location. In the event that the actual times between a drop off
and pickup are roughly consistent with the times implied by the shortest or fastest
route, in practice a 5-minute tolerance is permitted, I assume I know what path the cab
driver took between pickup and drop off. This condition is important for estimation as
the decision of the drivers modeled presupposes some understanding of what happened
between trips. If the routing program predicted a five-minute time between drop off
and pickup and the actual time was 1 hour, the driver could have taken many routes
or even been on a break between in the interim. Figure B.1 shows one such accurate
mapping (with the start at green, end at red) superimposed on a map of the area in
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Manhattan. Note the algorithm respects one-way versus bidirectional roads. The red
dotted line denotes the trajectory that would be used in the estimation.
Figure B.1: Sample of Accurate Route Estimate
Determining Route Estimation Accuracy
To test how accurate these routing algorithms are for relatively direct routes, I check
the consistency of estimated times and distances against known values for rides with
fares.1 In a random sample taken of nearly 300 thousand trips, the best estimated
trip distance — the best match to actual distance using the short and fast algorithm —
is “extremely” incorrect for only 2.9% of trips. Conditional on not being “extremely”
incorrect, that is the estimation error is off by less than 100%, Figure B.2 illustrates the
error distribution.
The averages (mean and median) of the distribution are both significantly above
0, 7.3% and 6.7% respectively, meaning that the trip distance is underestimated. This
bias may be born from a yet-to-correct issue with the routing that only plans the trip
of a cab from the nearest intersection to the intersection closest to its final destination.
There is no correction for the distance from the actual starting location of the cab to
1 The TLC dataset provides both actual travel distance and time for rides.
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Figure B.2: Percent Error in Estimated V. Actual Trip Distance
the first intersection on this route. The result of this issue on the error, however, is
ambiguous since the direction of bias will depend on whether this algorithm puts the
cab further along and further behind the actual route used.
Whether these routing algorithms are actually useful for determining the real route
taken by the cab is suspect. For shorter routes, small deviations from the actual in
the actual will yield large errors. In large trips, even larger deviations would be needed
to yield significant errors. Unfortunately, the correlation between trip distance and
error are positively correlated. For longer trips claims about actual routes would be
inaccurate. For shorter trips it may be possible to determine a small set of the potential
routes quite well if future work requires it.
The purpose of this exercise was to demonstrate the accuracy of estimated route
planning for cabs between rides by comparing known and estimated travel distance. But,
one assumption skirted above was in determining which of the two routing algorithms
is considered best. An alternative is not to select the best algorithm based on estimated
versus actual distance but based on estimated versus actual time. Redoing the analysis
with this definition of best, the mean error in estimated distances is only 3% in the
not-extremely-incorrect sample (within 300 seconds).
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B.2 Constructing Shifts
Shifts do not appear explicitly appear in the dataset. The information used to determine
shifts is depicted in Table B.1. The data have been sorted by medallion and time;
medallion is a cab identifier while the hack license is the cab driver identifier.
Medallion Hack License Pickup Time Dropoff Time Shift
A 1 4:30:00 4:36:00 1
A 1 4:40:00 5:00:00 1
A 2 6:00:00 6:14:00 2
A 2 6:20:00 6:26:00 2
A 2 10:18:00 10:30:00 3
A 2 10:42:00 10:48:00 3
B 2 13:10:00 13:22:00 4
B 2 13:24:00 13:30:00 4
Table B.1: Sample Data for Determining Shifts
The table depicts a few common situations that identify a change in shifts. Some are
obvious while others require discretion. If any of the following conditions are satisfied
then a change in shift is noted (again note that the data has been sorted by medallion
and pickup time by this point):
1. The cab driver (hack license) changes between subsequent observations
2. The cab driver does not change between subsequent observations BUT more than
3 hours have elapsed
It also implicitly assumed that if a cab driver jumps cabs, his or her activity in the first
cab is a different shift than in the second cab. Assuming this cab driver rents from a
fleet, which is likely if he or she is operating more than one cab, he or she would have
to pay a separate lease fee for activity in the first and second cab so splitting them into
shifts seems reasonable. In Table B.1 condition 1 determines the break between shift 1
and 2, condition 2 between shifts 2 and 3, and this implicit assumption between shifts
3 and 4.
The first condition is a clear indicator that shifts have changed. The second is
completely based on discretion and is typically required for cabs not managed by a
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fleet. Three hours seemed like a reasonable length of inactivity to presume the cab
driver stopped working for that particular shift, though even longer lengths might be
more appropriate. As a “safety net” for errors in discretion, the distribution of shift
lengths in terms of number of rides from known shifts, i.e. those determined by condition
1, is used to cut off shifts determined by condition 2 running abnormally long.
Table B.2 relates this exercise to the determination of searching trips. Technically,
each cab driver must be searching at least before his or her first pickup on a shift and
potentially after the last observed drop off. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine
the activity of the cab driver before and after each shift without assuming starting
location and time. Cab A, for example, would be considered out of service between
5:00:00 and 6:00:00, the last drop off of shift 1 and the first pickup of shift 2. Hence
searching trips are restricted to trips between observed rides in the data.
Medallion Hack License Search Start Search End Shift
A 1 4:36:00 4:40:00 1
A 2 6:14:00 6:20:00 2
A 2 10:30:00 10:42:00 3
B 2 13:22:00 13:24:00 4
Table B.2: Searching Trips for Sample Data
B.3 Identifying Decisions and Intersection Passing
Consider Figure B.3, a sample of what GPS road data and starting / ending location
data for three searching trips, denoted A, B, and C. There are two simple ways to try
to link cab location data to road data. One way is to link start and end points to
intersections (nodes); the other is to link them to road segments between intersections.
In both cases the easiest way to link off road grid GPS data to road data is via some
minimum distance function (detailed later). The figure shows in all three cases that
linking GPS data to nodes (red dotted lines) yields ambiguous results as to whether
the vehicle passed through an intersection. In cases A and B, the cab moves through
an intersection but both starting and ending points would be linked to the same node.
In case C the cab does not move through an intersection, but the starting and ending





Figure B.3: Determining Choice from Data
The easy alternative is to link off road GPS data to edges, i.e. road segments. If the
linked edges are different for the starting and end point, the cab must have traversed
through an intersection. This method correctly identifies whether the cab has moved
through an intersection in all three cases depicted in the figure. To link GPS data to
edges, I find which edge is the shortest distance from the point and project the point
onto each line segment. The second condition requires that the projected point falls in
between the end points of the edge segment.
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Construction of Charging Station Variable
The full structural model and the descriptive Poisson model in Section 3.3 both take
advantage of our highly granular data on the opening time and locations of charging
stations in California. We construct two sets of charging stations counts for consumers
living in a particular zip code: the charging stations near that home zip code and an
estimate of the charging stations near their work zip code. While home-area zip code
charging stations may seem like the most natural measure, home chargers for PEVs
appear to mitigate the need for other proximal charging stations. According to the
Center for Sustainable Energy (2013a) survey, approximately 90% of PEV owners own
Level 2 home chargers.
To construct a measure of home charging stations at a particular point in time, we
count the open charging stations within an X-mile radius of the centroid of every census
block group; this X can be flexible, as in the regressions in Table 3.9. To assign a count
to a particular zip code, we weight census block zip codes by the relative contribution
of the block to the zip code’s.1
To assign a count of work charging stations to a home zip code, we use additional
information from the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics Origin-Destination
Employment Statistics (LODES). LODES links workers to employers and further allows
us to observe a worker’s residential and employer census blocks. Employer location
1 Note that census blocks do not partition zip codes.
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is collected from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (formerly ES-202)
and employee residence location is collected from the Composite Person Record by the
Census Bureau.2 See Table 3.12 in Appendix 3.9 for more information.
We use the information from LODES to determine the relevant work locations for a
given home zip code. To construct the count of work charging stations, we weight the
number of open charging within an X-mile radius of the work census block’s centroid by
the home zip code’s population working in that census block. In the structural model
we can integrate simulated consumers over their using these weights as a probability
mass function.
For each home zip code, there are, on average, 11.89 associated work place zip codes.
Most home-work zip code links feature few unique households because of the sample
size and level of granularity. On average 1.78 households make the trip between the
home-work zip code, though some feature as many as 100.
2 See Graham et al. (2014).
